Interpretando radicalmente. Acerca de la teoría del significado de Davidson
Radically interpreting. On Davidson's Theory of Meaning
Abstract (en)
The aim of this paper is to show the central issues of Davidson's radical interpretation theory by making use of it in a concrete example in order to see how the interpretation proposal responds to the task it was designed for. In doing this, I’ll try to show radical interpretation as an independent theory and not just as a response to other theories of meaning, as it is usually seen.
Abstract (es)
El objetivo de este texto es presentar los aspectos centrales de la teoría de la interpretación radical de Davidson, haciendo uso de ella en un ejemplo concreto a fin de ver cómo esta propuesta interpretativa responde a la tarea para la cual ha sido formulada. Intentaré mostrar a la interpretación radical como una teoría independiente, y no solo como una respuesta a otras teorías del significado, como usualmente se la presenta.
References
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Davidson, D. (1973). Radical interpretation. In Inquiries into truth and interpretation. New York: Oxford University Press (1984).
Davidson, D. (1974). Belief and the basis of meaning. In Inquiries into truth and interpretation. New York: Cambridge University Press (1984).
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Davidson, D. (1979). The inscrutability of reference. In Inquiries into truth and interpretation. New York: Cambridge University Press (1984).
Davidson, D. (1986). A nice derangement of epitaphs. In Martinich, A. The philosophy of language. New York: Oxford University Press (1996).
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Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. In Martinich, A. The philosophy of language. New York: Oxford University Press (1996).
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In Martinich, A. The philosophy of language. New York: Oxford University Press (1996).
Malpas, J. (1992). Donald Davidson and the mirror of meaning. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Quine, W. O. (1991). Theories and things. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Searle, J. (1987). Indeterminacy, empiricism, and the first person. Journal of Philosophy, 84.
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