Das causas na Ciência Política: uma intervenção filosófica necessária
On causes in political science: a necessary philosophical intervention
Resumen (es)
Como as definições de causa e causalidade são estabelecidas na Ciência Política? A explicação causal tornou-se fundamental para a constituição da disciplina como ciência capaz de produzir não só entendimentos, como também previsões acerca dos fenômenos políticos. Porém, a centralidade da causalidade tem sido reduzida à questão da inferência causal, elidindo discussões ontológicas, epistemológicas e metodológicas sobre o significado de causa. Nesse artigo, exploramos os modelos de explicação causal na Filosofia como forma de promover um diálogo entre as concepções de causalidade na Ciência Política para além do problema da inferência causal. Argumentamos que a Ciência Política recorre a diferentes concepções de causalidade, mas seu engajamento com reflexões mais substantivas ainda é limitado. Propomos um canal de diálogo com a literatura do realismo filosófico e suas intervenções sobre poderes causais, capacidades e tendências, as quais oferecem uma base ontológica para as discussões de causalidade na Ciência Política.
Resumen (en)
What are the definitions of cause and causality in Political Science? Causal explanation has become fundamental for the constitution of the discipline as a science capable of producing not only understandings, but also predictions about political phenomena. Nevertheless, the centrality of causality has been reduced to the question of causal inference, eliding ontological, epistemological and methodological discussions about the meaning of cause. In this article, we explore models of causal explanation in philosophy as a way to promote a dialogue between the conceptions of causality in political science that go beyond the problem of causal inference. We argue that political science mobilises different conceptions of causality, but its engagement with more substantive reflections is still limited. We propose a dialogue with the literature of philosophical realism and its interventions on causal powers, capabilities and tendencies, which offer an ontological basis for discussions of causality in political science.
Resumen (pt)
Como as definições de causa e causalidade são estabelecidas na Ciência Política? A explicação causal tornou-se fundamental para a constituição da disciplina como ciência capaz de produzir não só entendimentos, como também previsões acerca dos fenômenos políticos. Porém, a centralidade da causalidade tem sido reduzida à questão da inferência causal, elidindo discussões ontológicas, epistemológicas e metodológicas sobre o significado de causa. Nesse artigo, exploramos os modelos de explicação causal na Filosofia como forma de promover um diálogo entre as concepções de causalidade na Ciência Política para além do problema da inferência causal. Argumentamos que a Ciência Política recorre a diferentes concepções de causalidade, mas seu engajamento com reflexões mais substantivas ainda é limitado. Propomos um canal de diálogo com a literatura do realismo filosófico e suas intervenções sobre poderes causais, capacidades e tendências, as quais oferecem uma base ontológica para as discussões de causalidade na Ciência Política.
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