Harboring alien lifeworlds: The second-person in thought insertion
Harboring alien lifeworlds: the second-person in thought insertion
Resumen (es)
In phenomenology, the delusion of thought insertion is described and explained in different ways. There is a common idea that the delusion depends either on a lack of sense of agency or on a confusion between self and others. I propose that the delusion is an alienation in regard to what is expressed in some thoughts, that make them unfamiliar. In this perspective, the delusion has to do with the fact that the lifeworld expressed in inserted thought is given in a second-person perspective, is rooted in a different lived-body experience than one’s own. This contrasts with ordinary thoughts which are given in the first-person perspective, with which we have a sense of intimacy. This discussion is an opportunity for putting forth the idea of the second-person perspective: that is, certain experiences of the world are given to me through others, as distinct from those that are given to me directly as a lived body. In inserted thoughts, there is a sense in which some perspectives of reality, different to my own, are disclosed through an alien voice or through inside me. The distinction between the first person and second person perspectives leads to a better understanding of the primal constitution of the self and of others, based on the relation between the body and the world as it is given to us.
Resumen (en)
In phenomenology, the delusion of thought insertion is described and explained in different ways. There is a common idea that the delusion depends either on a lack of sense of agency or on a confusion between self and others. I propose that the delusion is an alienation in regard to what is expressed in some thoughts, that make them unfamiliar. In this perspective, the delusion has to do with the fact that the lifeworld expressed in inserted thought is given in a second-person perspective, is rooted in a different lived-body experience than one’s own. This contrasts with ordinary thoughts which are given in the first-person perspective, with which we have a sense of intimacy. This discussion is an opportunity for putting forth the idea of the second-person perspective: that is, certain experiences of the world are given to me through others, as distinct from those that are given to me directly as a lived body. In inserted thoughts, there is a sense in which some perspectives of reality, different to my own, are disclosed through an alien voice or through inside me. The distinction between the first person and second person perspectives leads to a better understanding of the primal constitution of the self and of others, based on the relation between the body and the world as it is given to us.
Referencias
Colombetti, G. (2014). The feeling body. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Depraz, N. (2012). Empathy and second-person methodology. Continental philosophy review, 45, 447–459.
Frith, C. (1992). The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia. Hove: Psychology Press.
Fuchs, T. & Röhricht, F. (2017). Schizophrenia and intersubjectivity: An embodied and enactive approach to psychopathology and psychotherapy. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 24 (2), pp. 127-142
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes de mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Garavito, M. C. (2022). Hacerse mundo con los otros. Intersubjetividad como co-constitución. Bogotá, Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
Henriksen, M. Parnas, J. y Zahavi, D. (2019). Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia Consciousness and cognition, 74, 1-9. Available online at: https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S1053810019302120?token=ED5871970599A52FC7B775863F15BC98AF9F57E96DA52D25C819EED35E12395A03FE4968145566D24680BC065F219FA6
Husserl, E. (1966): Analysen zur passive Synthesis. Trad. Anthony Steinbock. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Husserl, E. (1989a). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second Book Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Husserl, E. (1989b). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Husserl, E. (1991). On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Husserl, E. (2006). Individualität in Zeitlichkeit und Kausalität. En D. Lohmar (ed.), Späte Texte Über Zeitkonstitution (377-446). The Netherlands: Springer.
Krueger, J. & Henriksen, M.G. (2016) Embodiment and Affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia. A Phenomenological Analysis. En J.A. Simmons, J.E. Hackett (eds.). Phenomenology for the Twenty-First Century (249-267). EE.UU.: Palgrave Mcmillan.
Jaspers, K. (1997). General psychopathology. Johns Hopkins University Press, London.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2007). The child’s relations with others. In T. Toadvine & L. Lawlor (eds.), The Merleau-Ponty reader. pp. 146–184. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Moore, J. (2016). What Is the Sense of Agency and Why Does it Matter? Frontiers in Psychology, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01272
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). Phenomenology of perception. London: Routledge.
Parnas, J., Moler, P., Kircher, T., Thalbitzer, J., Jansson, L., Handest, P. & Zahavi, D. (2005). EASE: Examination of Anomalous Self- Experience. Psychopathology, 38, pp- 236-258.
Petrolini, V. (2020). Too much or too little? Disorders of agency on a spectrum. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 16(2), 79-99.
Ratcliffe, M. & Wilkinson, S. (2015). Thought Insertion Clarified. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22 (11-12), pp. 246-269.
Ratcliffe, M. (2017). Real Hallucinations: Psychiatric Illness, Intentionality, and the interpersonal world. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Roy, J. M. (2017). La conciencia de sí como otro: Hacia un re-examen de la tradición psicopatológica. Ideas Valores, 66, 193-220.
Sebastian, M. A (2019). Subjective Character, the Ego and De Se Representation: Phenomenological, Metaphysical and Representational Considerations on Pre-reflective Self-awareness. In: M. Borner, M. Frank, y K. Williford. Senses of Self: Approaches to Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. Frankfurt: Gerhard Preyer, pp. 316-339.
Shannon, B. (2003). The antipodes of the mind. Charting the Phenomenology of the Ayahuasca Experience. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine (2011). The primacy of movement. New York, John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Steel, C. y Berman, K. (2001) The day the voices stopped. A memoir of madness and hope. New York: Basic Books.
Sripada, Ch. (2018). An exploration/exploitation trade-off between mind wandering and goal-directed thinking. In: K. C. Fox & K. Christoff, (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought. EE: UU: Oxford University Press.
Spitz, R. (1966). First Year of Life: A Psychoanalytic Study of Normal and Deviant Development of Object Relations. New York: International Universities Press.
Zahavi, D. (2005). Subjectivity and selfhood. Investigating the First-Person Perspective. EE.UU.: Bradford books.
Zahavi, D. (2008). Simulation, projection and empathy. Consciousness and Cognition, 17 (2), 514-522.
Cómo citar
Licencia
Derechos de autor 2024 Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.
Los autores mantienen los derechos sobre los artículos y por tanto son libres de compartir, copiar, distribuir, ejecutar y comunicar públicamente la obra bajo las condiciones siguientes:
Reconocer los créditos de la obra de la manera especificada por el autor o el licenciante (pero no de una manera que sugiera que tiene su apoyo o que apoyan el uso que hace de su obra).
Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana está bajo una licencia Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
La Universidad Santo Tomás conserva los derechos patrimoniales (copyright) de las obras publicadas, y favorece y permite la reutilización de las mismas bajo la licencia anteriormente mencionada.
