Estudio de revisión sobre el sesgo de creencia
Review Study on Belief Bias
Resumo (pt)
El sesgo de creencia describe la tendencia a evaluar la validez de un argumento a partir de la credibilidad de su conclusión y no de su estructura lógica. Este trabajo presenta una revisión sistemática de literatura para analizar el estado actual de la investigación sobre este sesgo cognitivo. Se realizó una búsqueda bibliográfica en PsycNET, EBSCO Publishing, ERIC, DialNet, RedalyC y Scielo, de la cual se obtuvo una muestra final de 64 artículos tras aplicar criterios de inclusión y exclusión. Los principales hallazgos muestran la evolución de las teorías explicativas del sesgo de creencia y la consolidación de líneas de investigación específicas. Se discuten, además, las principales discusiones abiertas en este campo y se destacan líneas de investigación a futuro.
Resumo (en)
Belief bias refers to the tendency to assess the validity of an argument based on how believable its conclusion is, rather than on its logical structure. This paper presents a systematic literature review analysing the current state of research on this cognitive bias. A bibliographic search was conducted across databases including PsycNET, EBSCO Publishing, ERIC, DialNet, RedalyC, and SciELO. After applying specific inclusion and exclusion criteria, a final sample of 64 articles was selected. Key findings illustrate the evolution of explanatory theories related to belief bias as well as the establishment of particular research lines. Additionally, this review discusses the main ongoing debates in the field and highlights directions for future research.
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