La economía política del tamaño del Estado
The politic economy in the size of the State
Abstract (en)
This paper provides a critical survey of the definitions political determinants on the state size, understood as public expenditure of the national government, which is linked to different political variables rather than economics do. Thus, public expenditure matches with the wishes, requests or demand of the voters by redistribution, and at the same time the rulers seek to maximize their own benefit. This research did not involve the concept of a benevolent or benefactor government, whose fundamental purpose is to seek the maximization of social welfare.Abstract (es)
Este documento ofrece un análisis crítico de las definiciones de los determinantes políticos del tamaño del Estado, entendido como el gasto público del Gobierno nacional que se vincula a diferentes variables políticas más que económicas. Así, el gasto público corresponde con los deseos, solicitudes o demanda de los votantes por redistribución, y a su vez los gobernantes buscan maximizar su propio beneficio. Esta investigación se aparta de la concepción de un gobierno benefactor o benevolente, cuyo propósito fundamental es buscar la maximización del bienestar social.
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