Small-World Networks of corruption


  • Pablo Morales Universidad Manuela Beltran
  • Jorge Finke Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Cali


Palabras clave:

Corruption, Local decision-making, Small-world networks


Collective behavior forms and spreads through social contact. This thesis introduces a framework for understanding how the structure of social ties may impact the evolution of bribery. We represent relationships as highly clustered networks with small characteristic path lengths (i.e., small-world models having “local” and “long-range” contacts). Based on a principal-agent-client formulation, our model focuses on the effects of clustering on an equilibrium of persistent bribery. Collective outcomes depend on decision-making mechanisms that rely on sensitivity functions, which capture the level of influence between local contacts. Moreover, we represent the evolution of the network as a system of differential equations and identify its region of parameters for which the equilibrium of persistent bribery is stable. Our results show that an increase in clustering tends to decrease the levels of bribery. A more sensitive response to the behavior of neighbors, on the other hand, tends to increase bribery, but only up to a certain point. Beyond this threshold, the expected level of bribery remains constant, despite variations in the structural properties of the network.

Biografía del autor/a

Pablo Morales, Universidad Manuela Beltran

Ingeniero Electrónico de la UNIVERSIDAD DEL VALLE. Magister en Ingeniería Electrónica de la PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD JAVERIANA. Docente tiempo completo, Facultad de ingeniería Electrónica, UNIVERSIDAD MANUELA BELTRAN

Jorge Finke, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Cali

Ph.D. in Control Theory, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, The Ohio State University, Ohio, United States. Master’s in Control Theory, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, The Ohio State University, Ohio, United States. Bachelor of Science in Control Theory, The Ohio State University, Ohio, USA Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Cali, Associate Professor, 2008 - current, full time


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Cómo citar

Morales, P., & Finke, J. (2016). Small-World Networks of corruption. Revista CIFE: Lecturas De Economía Social, 17(26), 19–36.