Harboring alien *lifeworlds*: the second-person in thought insertion*

Albergar mundos de vida ajenos: la segunda persona en la inserción del pensamiento

[Artículo]

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Abstract

In phenomenology, the delusion of thought insertion is described and explained in different ways. There is a common idea that the delusion depends either on a lack of sense of agency or on a confusion between self and others. I propose that the delusion is an alienation in regard to what is expressed in some thoughts, that make them unfamiliar. In this perspective, the delusion has to do with the fact that the lifeworld expressed in inserted thought is given in a second-person perspective, is rooted in a different lived-body experience than one’s own. This contrasts with ordinary thoughts which are given in the first-person perspective, with which we have a sense of intimacy. This discussion is an opportunity for putting forth the idea of the second-person perspective: that is, certain experiences of the world are given to me through others, as distinct from those that are given to me directly as a lived body. In inserted thoughts, there is a sense in which some perspectives of reality, different to my own, are disclosed through an alien voice or through inside me. The distinction between the first person and second person perspectives leads to a better understanding of the primal constitution of the self and of others, based on the relation between the body and the world as it is given to us.

Key words: phenomenology, structure of consciousness, intersubjectivity, lifeworld, lived body, minimal otherness.

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Resumen

En fenomenología, el delirio de inserción de pensamiento se describe y explica de diferentes maneras. Existe una idea común de que el delirio depende de una falta de sentido de agencia o de una confusión entre uno mismo y los demás. Propongo que el delirio es una alienación respecto de lo que se expresa en algunos pensamientos, que los vuelven desconocidos. En esta perspectiva, el delirio tiene que ver con el hecho de que el mundo de la vida expresado en el pensamiento insertado se da en una perspectiva de segunda persona, está arraigado en una experiencia corporal vivida diferente a la propia. Esto contrasta con los pensamientos ordinarios que se dan en la perspectiva de primera persona, con los que tenemos una sensación de intimidad. Esta discusión es una oportunidad para plantear la idea de la perspectiva de segunda persona: es decir, ciertas experiencias del mundo me son dadas a través de otros, a diferencia de aquellas que me son dadas directamente como un cuerpo vivido. En los pensamientos insertados, hay un sentido en el que algunas perspectivas de la realidad, diferentes a la mía, se revelan a través de una voz ajena o a través de mi interior. La distinción entre las perspectivas de primera y segunda persona conduce a una mejor comprensión de la constitución primordial del yo y de los demás, basada en la relación entre el cuerpo y el mundo tal como nos es dado.

Palabras clave: fenomenología, estructura de la conciencia, intersubjetividad, mundo de vida, cuerpo vivido, alteridad mínima.

Introduction

Delusions are a common symptom of psychosis. One such delusion, that of thought insertion, involves the experiencing of some thoughts as alien and, therefore, as produced by another (see Ratcliffe & Wilkinson, 2015; Herinksen, Parnas & Zahavi, 2019). In The Day the Voices Stopped: A Memoir of Madness and Hope (Steele & Berman, 2001), a book about the life of a schizophrenic patient, the descriptions of psychotic episodes give us some insights into the nature of inserted thoughts. The patient reports that, in one episode, voices in his head say “What a Loser! You know your life is over (...) Unless you kill yourself, you will live like this – an animal – for the rest of your life, with us as the only people who talk to you ... You have to kill yourself, Kenny. There is no other way” (Steele & Berman, 2001, p. 58).
This kind of reports are sometimes described as inserted thoughts, inserted voices, or auditory hallucinations. Although the distinction between external and internal voices is somewhat fuzzy, in the case above, the patient experiences some voices “within his head” and others as coming, for example, from the radio (Steele & Berman, 2001, pp.1-2), and as unwelcome intrusions in his life.

Some perspectives in phenomenology and philosophy of mind ascribe different causes for this phenomenon. I begin by summarizing some of those perspectives, which I lump into three general views (see Table 1): The first one gathers perspectives in which the patient’s experiences are viewed as a problem of self-consciousness, specifically a lack of sense of agency over thoughts or internal voices; the second one includes perspectives in which inserted thoughts are seen as a problem of intersubjectivity: they have to do with an impairment in the distinction between self and others. Finally, a third group involves a perspective in which the experience of insertion takes us to the core of the intentional structure of thinking. The difference between a normal thought and one experienced as alien lies in its content. There is an element in what is expressed in certain thoughts that causes them to be experienced as something akin to a perception, rather than a thought. The key would be to identify what, within the content of what is thought, makes it seem foreign; in this way we avoid supposing there is something like a consciousness of self added as content to normal mental states.

My goal in this paper is to propose a fourth perspective (inspired by phenomenology), that gathers some key ideas of the other three. Following Ratcliffe, I state that it is necessary to understand alien thoughts in terms of the structure of the intentionality of thinking itself, and therefore, in terms of what is and how is expressed in alien thoughts. What these thoughts express, the kind of information that they bring forward, and the affections that they imply, are all clues for understanding the difference between thought insertions and other pathological symptoms (e.g, rumination in TOC patients; or the phenomenon mind wandering). From the perspective of Husserlian and Merleau-Pontian phenomenology, the meaning of thoughts encompasses both the literal expression and

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1 In this paper, I won’t explore the phenomenological differences between these experiences. What matters here is the feeling of lacking familiarity with certain linguistic expressions (see Ratcliffe, 2017).
the implications it holds for the patient's life. This implies that the spoken words are intertwined with the patient's general approach to the world, intercorporeal experiences, and autobiography. The reason that some thoughts are experienced as foreign may be that the expressed lifeworlds they imply are different from that of the patient. They do not mesh with the patient’s familiar way of thinking, her historicity and relationship to things and others.

I will provide some arguments to support the idea that the phenomenon of thought insertion does not have to do with a distinction between self and other. Rather, it has to do with the fact that what is expressed in the inserted thought is given in a second-person perspective, and therefore, the patient conclude that thought is linked to a different lived body. This would contrast with ordinary thoughts which are given in the first-person perspective, and with which we have a sense of intimacy (see, Zahavi, 2005); that is, they are in accordance with the way the world is habitually given to us. To pursue this perspective, I will explore the constitutive activity that is involved in the activity of thinking. As we shall see, this distinction between the first person and second person perspectives of givenness leads to a better understanding of the primal constitution of the self and of others.

**Some theoretical explanations of thought insertion**

**Insertion as a problem of self-awareness**

Philosophical interpretations of thought insertion are based on the evidence provided by patient reports. Patients tend to interpret inserted thoughts as not being produced or controlled by them, or even as coming from some other with a specific identity. Therefore, one of the most common avenues suggested for understanding inserted thought from a phenomenological perspective is positing that it has to do with a problem in self-awareness (cf. Frith, 1992; Parnas, Møller, Kircher, Thalbitzer, Jansson, Handest & Zahavi, 2005).

From a phenomenological perspective on states of consciousness, it seems that the way in which the flow of consciousness is constituted in disease gives a clue to the problem that we are facing (cf. Parnas, et. al, 2005). For Gallagher (2005), this problem in the
stream of consciousness corresponds to an affectation of the temporal structure of thinking. According to Husserl (1991), a temporal structure underlies conscious states: what is experienced in the present is linked to the immediate past (retentions, in Husserl’s terminology) and the immediate, expected, future (protentions). This link determines the temporal flow of consciousness; and therefore, any disruption in this structure could affect thought experiences. Insertion could be the result of some alteration of this natural flow, resulting in an affectation of the sense of self-awareness over certain thoughts, so that they lose their mineness (Parnas, et al., 2005, 329). Thoughts become detached from the temporal chain that usually links them together and lose the mineness that gives them global cohesion as given in the first-person perspective, and therefore appear as alien. As in any set of coordinated elements, if one of them is uncoordinated, it acquires an alien character.

A similar perspective on thought insertion holds that the cause of the problem with the sense of self or mineness lies in the sense of agency that accompanies conscious states (cf. Frith, 1992; Gallagher, 2005). When the sense of agency is lost in relation to certain thoughts (that is, when the sense that they are produced by us is lost), thoughts become reified, which implies that they become divided into discrete units. According to Frith (1992), some of these units are experienced as phenomena in the world (e.g. as thoughts made by others), and some as phenomena of the self.

While Gallagher agrees that the problem of insertion is characterized by the loss of a sense of agency over certain thoughts, he disagrees with Frith’s (1992) contention that the explanation is a failure in the metarepresentational mechanism that determines agency. For Frith, the delusion of inserted thought appears as proof of the existence of subpersonal mechanisms that operate at a different level from the phenomenon itself; a sort of real-time evaluator of the phenomenon, relating it to the sense of self. Authors such as Zahavi (2008) have pointed out the problem of positing subpersonal mechanisms to which we have no direct access; for Gallagher (2005), such a mechanism does not accurately reflect the experiences of self (agency and ownership) that occur at the pre-reflective level of consciousness. It is not necessary to posit a different process to explain
the conscious experience; according to Gallagher (2005) we can find the lack of sense of agency in the experience itself.

Although it is possible to identify the basis of the psychopathology in the symptom itself, we must carefully consider whether the lack of sense of agency is an accurate explanation for inserted thoughts. Bear in mind that, in some cases, the patient may recognize that the inserted thought is self-produced, and yet think that it has a certain alien quality (Roy, 2017). Inserted thought would entail a kind of fragmentation of the self, in which the authentic self interacts with another that is “self” as well.

**Pathological otherness and intercorporeality**

There are other features of patient reports that are worth considering; for instance, the feeling of otherness in alien thoughts (Fuchs & Röhricht, 2017; Roy, 2017). Of all the characteristics of the experience of thought insertion, Roy especially points out that some patients experience alien thoughts as coming from an inauthentic self; that is, they consider inserted thoughts as produced in some way by themselves but in an unfamiliar, non-habitual manner.

Roy (2017) believes that the experience of thought insertion is produced by a loss of boundaries between self and others: “the delusional person has a conscience of himself as another” (Roy, 2017, 203, my translation). The fact that one’s own thought is experienced as strange does not mean that inserted thoughts come from another. Rather the experience is a result of a self that is fragmented into two or more selves: an alter ego and an original ego. However, inserted thought does not refer to a kind of multiple personality disorder because the patient is completely conscious of the fragmentation, experiencing one self as original and the other as alien. The fact that one of the selves is experienced as other, points to an important interrelatedness in the constitution of the self and of others.

In a similar vein, Fuchs & Röhricht (2017) emphasize the embodied aspects of conscious states, arguing that delusions, in general, have to do with an impairment of intercorporeal experiences. Inserted thoughts are symptoms of a more general pathology related to an embodied self embedded in a social world.
In Fuchs & Röhricht’s perspective, thinking is a phenomenon that participates in embodied relations with the world. This implies a shift in perspective: rather than seeing psychopathology as an accumulation of disconnected symptoms, the key is to view it in a more ecological sense of embodied and situated experience.

The insertion of thought, following Fuchs & Röhricht, is a paradoxical phenomenon of self-centeredness since there is a confusion between what is produced by another, and what is one's own. In other words, the lack of intercorporeal resonance would affect the experience of one's own thoughts. This idea calls for a reflection about the relationship and difference between the private world of thinking and the public experience of interacting with others. Although with a different emphasis, this proposal resembles Roy's in that alienation points to a deeper problem than that which is initially apparent from patient reports; according to both authors, the problem ultimately lies in the patient's constitution of intersubjectivity.

An additional perspective on thought insertion is provided by Ratcliffe (2017). Although his theory seems to move away from the perspectives presented here, I believe that he offers other elements for an embodied and situated perspective of the psychotic symptom. To wit, the emphasis the author places on investigating the content of inserted thoughts and what is expressed therein. An example can serve to clarify this: in other perspectives reviewed here, the thought content (e.g. “I have to buy the car for my son tomorrow”) is different to the experience that I have of myself having that thought; it is believed that the pathology corresponds to a damage of the experience of myself having a thought, but not of the content of the thought itself. In Ratcliffe’s proposal, by contrast, emphasis is put on the content of thoughts (that tomorrow I have to buy the car for my son), and this implies inquiring into what precisely is odd about this content (e.g. perhaps the person having the thought does not even have children).

In my view, focusing on the content of the thought itself rather than on other elements that may accompany it, such as a sense of self, provides an interesting perspective of thoughts. From this perspective, thoughts are unique forms of expression within the life of a given subject, considering thoughts in their historical context and in their relation to
other thoughts and conscious experiences. It is this interplay that may become altered under certain conditions.

**Thought insertion as a problem of thought contents.**

Ratcliffe (2017) suggests that patient reports are the result of the affectation of the modal structure of intentionality. For some reason, the content of thoughts is misplaced as proceeding from some outer source, as in auditory experiences -although it does not precisely involve perceiving an outer voice-.

According to Ratcliffe, thoughts appear as inserted when their content is experienced as alien. “Alien” is reflectively translated as “not my own”: the intentional content of the thought is something I could not have thought. Since a thought is a personal experience, if it appears as strange it should correspond to an internal quasi-perception: inserted thought is indeed a thought, but with a qualitative aspect of perception. Since the content is alien, it must be produced by another, and the patient must therefore be listening rather than thinking, even if what he hears is produced “within” him; the content distortion leads the patient to confuse a thought with a perception.

Let’s imagine that the thought that is experienced as alien is more extravagant than the banal “I have to buy my son the car tomorrow” for example “Kill God” (cf. Frith, 1992, 66) or “You have to kill yourself (cf. Steele & Berman, 2001, p. 58). For Ratcliffe, the belief, desire or imagining appears as perceived -this sentence has not been wished or imagined, but rather heard-. This confusion between perception and thought leads to a confusion between self and non-self: it is not a problem with the constitution of the self that generates the distortion, but something closer to Roy’s position, a problem with the constitution of intersubjectivity.

Ratcliffe inquiries into the experiential differences between intentional states and concludes that the difference between mental contents that are the product of thought and those that are the product of perception has to do with control: we cannot control what we perceive (its presence or absence does not depend on the self), whereas we can
control what we think. Ratcliffe’s explanation of the delusion differs from the others in that his starting point is not the lack of control over thought, as if control were a kind of content associated to the eidetic content of thought, but rather the fact that inserted thought does not appear as thought because it, for instance, has rude or violent content (which is common in this kind of delusion), a kind of content that the patient would not normally express, that does not fit with who the patient is. It is experienced as involuntary, and therefore as perceived. While there is a problem of control involved in alien thoughts, it arises not from a special type of content of a controlling self added to thoughts but from the involuntary nature of the expressed thought content.

On the other hand, and contrary to Gallagher, Ratcliffe agrees that this confusion of intentional states is a product of subpersonal mechanisms, which again gives rise to the issue of explaining the delusion through processes that are not accessible through the patient’s experience.

As I mentioned earlier, the phenomenological perspective I advocate here argues that there is no need to involve a self with a special kind of content accompanying every conscious experience to explain why “normal” contents are experienced as a part of a set of experiences that involve one singular life.

For instance, while my coworker may normally think “tomorrow I have to buy the car for my son”, form me, that thought would feel alien: This could be because such a thought doesn’t align with my family situation (that I don’t have children), my expectations of what I have to do tomorrow (I will be busy for six hours, travelling internationally), my typical thought process for a significant purchase or investment (I have not considering financing, the kind of car, or where I should buy it), the emotions associated with this thought (it may come associated with anxiety, whereas in a normal experience it would be associated with excitement) etc.

Ultimately, the key point is that, while I may express all this experiences reflectively as happening or not happening to an “I”, that “I” in a more tacit and implicit manner, a sense of familiarity with the history of a body situated in its world. A phenomenological perspective on the constitution of thought can provide a fresh light on the delusion of
inserted thought, focusing on the content of thought, as seen in the light of historicity and of the subjective lifeworld.

**Thought insertion as a problem of the second person.**

The three general perspectives on thought insertion that I have discussed contribute to the explanation I will propose. First, I am in favor of a phenomenological approach that focuses on how inserted thoughts are constituted (as seen in Gallagher, 2005, and Henriksen, et. al, 2019) rather than one that tackles the problem of causality in terms of subpersonal (and therefore, unidentified) processes (see Ratcliffe, 2017). Second, viewing inserted thoughts as evidence of a fragmented sense of self and otherness (following Roy, 2017), as a part of a general embodied and embedded subjective life (following Fuchs & Röhricht, 2017) prompts consideration of the constitutive experience of thoughts influenced by a primordial experience of otherness. Third, Ratcliffe’s emphasis on attending to the content of thoughts rather than to some sense that apparently accompanies them – i.e. agency-, leads to a refinement of what is understood as a sense of self involving in every conscious experience.

I argue that contrary to an idea of a self as a special kind of content, the feeling of self implies that every conscious state is linked to the same lived body. This means that a thought is not distinct from the experience of an embodied and situated human body. From a phenomenological perspective, this body is not understood as an object or a mere set of organs, but an intentional entity expressing itself while constituting and co-constituting the world with others. In Husserlian terms, *lifeworld* is the ground in which human life unfolds (cf. Husserl, 1989b). It is not the totality of existing objects and others but a web of intentional implications, a network of horizons that shapes how things appear to me as a consciousness. To that extent, it is the place where horizons unfold, as possibilities of meaning that link the past of previous meanings with the future of possibilities. All intentional experiences, including what is expressed in a thought, are coherent with every subject’s perspective of the lifeworld, encompassing their historical experiences. Thought is a way of expressing that lifeworld, so that each thought must be
seen in consideration of that network of meanings that constitute my world (cf. Husserl, 2006).

If a thought does not participate in the individual’s perspective of that lifeworld, thus is perceived as happening to someone else. Ultimately, though insertion takes us to the heart of what it means to have experiences in the second person. I will elaborate these ideas in what follows.

**An embodied perspective of thinking**

Constitutive phenomenology has a starting point in the supposition that everything that is given, in a first-person perspective, without an apparent exercise of consciousness (see Husserl, 1966) is based upon primal structures of intentionality. According to a phenomenology centered on the body (cf. Merleau-Ponty, 2012) and on the kinetic/kinesthetic experiences (Sheets-Johntone, 2011), a lived body gives meaning to the world in its motioning, perceiving, and emoting, and experiences itself while gives meaning to the world. In other words, what is given to consciousness is coherent with the link between body and world.

Merleau-Ponty (2012) highlighted the link between body and world in perception. What is given in perception points to primal structures of experience of the lived body, that constitutes itself and constitutes the meaning of the world in its being-of-the-world (Merleau-Ponty, 2012). The intimate relationship with the world for oneself is due to the historic relationship of the lived body and world. We do not approach reality in some pure state, but rather mediated by our history of bodily interactions with it; we do not experience our body as a piece of organic machinery, but through this constitutive experience of the world. Therefore, our world corresponds to our experience of the body: when my hand curves as it approaches the mug, as I tense the muscles of my arm, I

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2 Recently, there has been an increased interest in the role of emoting in the constitution of a lifeworld. The world is constituted affectively through affective resonance with things and others, and a sense of self is constituted through this process (cf. Colombetti, 2014). For these reasons, a lack of affective resonance has consequences in the constitution of self and world, reflected in a generalized apathy, and can cause mental retardation and even death in children deprived of affective resonance (Spitz, 1966). And if affective constitution impinges upon the emergence of the world to perception it would also impinge on the emergence of the world to thought, because thought is also an expression of the unity of lived-body and world (Merleau-Ponty, 2012).
anticipate and tactually constitute the object I am reaching for. The weight and proportions of the mug are given in my motions. At the same time, the textures of the cup and of the hot coffee are implied in the anticipatory movements of my mouth which opens slightly, and of my tongue: my motions would be different for a cold beverage.

Following Merleau-Ponty (2012), thought is an expression of the body (that is, thought is an activity of the lived body), therefore, we may posit that the lifeworld is also built on the passivity of what is given in images, fantasies, and memories. This implies that thought, in as much as it is an expression of the lifeworld, is linked to the historicity of the subject’s relations to the world and to others. All thought is a manifestation of this historicity and therefore its meaning is given in relation to the larger flow of thoughts as well as situated and embodied experiences (cf. Fuchs & Röhricht, 2017; Ratcliffe, 2017).

Likewise, thought is a way I express myself; therefore, I can recognize my own style of thinking, just as I can recognize my style of walking, or the way I react emotionally to certain situations. This recognition of my own expressivity is implied in the idea that, in conscious experiences, we not only have experiences about the external world, but these experiences include a sense of self. According to Zahavi (e.g. 2005) a sort of “meness” can be characterized as something distinguishable from experiences; this meness is a quality or character present in all givenness. But such a quality is not an I-qualia (see Heriksen, Parnas y Zahavi, 2019, 1); rather, it has to do with the indexicality of the experiences; namely, the fact that they appear as given here. Following of the idea of the primacy of the body in conscious experiences, this meness is a feature of the lived body as the center of the meaning (see Sheets-Johnstone, 2011; Merleau-Ponty, 2012; Garavito, 2022).

The first-person experience is based on this referentiality. This has an important implication: we cannot be conscious of a thing without this meness. The aboutness of consciousness and the experience of the self at this primal level are part of the same phenomenon. Furthermore, it is through such self-referentiality that the body appears

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1 Following Husserl (1989b), since the world of experience is different from the objective world of science, then the world of thought, as lifeworld, is different from the logical and mathematical world upon which it is founded.
linked to the world: the body is constituted in that unity in which the world and the sense of self emerge.

The experience of meness would not be an added content to thought but rather a recognition of my own style in it. This would be in line with critiques of the sense of self as a special content, in that this does not correspond to subjective experience (Sebastian, 2019). The meness is a constitutive part of any experience in as much they all express the historicity through which a lived body has constituted a world for itself. In other words, referentiality to an originally corporeal self is a constitutive part of reality. All experience of reality is constructed upon an indexicality, an agenciality and a propriety that point to the embodied consciousness to which it has been given.

**The second person as primal otherness.**

The consciousness of another is also experienced bodily: in another’s movements and spoken or written expressions, in his gestures, “in the manner in which the other deals with the world” (Merleau-Ponty, 2007, p. 146), I grasp the other. To grasp the consciousness of another in his dealing with the world, is to grasp how he lives it, through his expressions. This means that in another’s expression, in the mark he leaves upon the world, I also grasp what the world is like for that other body (e.g, in the way another hand holds an object I experience the softness of it). I posit that this lived experience of another’s way of dealing with the world, of what the world is to another, is more primal than our reflectively ascribing consciousness to another. Before another consciousness is given to us as such, we take notice of another’s intentionalities, that leave a mark upon the world for me. For the first-person consciousness, other intentionalities appear as horizons of meaning in the second-person perspective: your enjoyment of that gross licorice you are eating makes me see it as enjoyable, in the second-person perspective. The old problem of solipsism, of whether others are conscious or not, is posterior to the experience of the way others give meaning to the world. Before the other is seen as another, there is a primal otherness experienced in this noticing of the meanings given by another body. This primal otherness contrasts experientially with primal mineness or meness, the experience of the world as being given in the first person (see Zahavi, 2005).
Is it possible to think about the experience of other-consciousness in terms of minimal otherness, and therefore, about some perspectives of the world as pre-reflectively given in the second-person perspective? I believe so.

Suppose that the hand that is reaching for the mug is not mine, but my partner’s, as I look. As soon as the hot beverage touches his lips and tongue, he makes a gesture, he contracts his face and his lips, letting his tongue stick out with a moan. At that moment, his expressions change my relationship to the beverage. The coffee was far hotter than expected: not only do my tongue and lips alter their anticipatory motions, but my hand narrows its curvature, and the angle of approach of my arm changes as well, when I try to take the mug that my partner has left on the table. I wish to grab the mug with my fingertips rather than with the palm of my hand: the warmth of the mug appears menacing, rather than comforting, as it appeared before. Through another’s body, the mug is given to me as excessively hot. But this change in how the mug is given, is primarily not given in the first-person perspective, but rather in the lived experience of another body as I resonate with it. I experienced the beverage from a second person perspective.

Whereas meness is experienced as the here, and therefore is related to the experience of the lived body, otherness is what is given as there, as given in another lived body. This character of here or there is independent of the organization of objects in the visual field, or of the place that my organic body occupies in space (there may be a “there” in my own body, analogous to thought insertion); it has to do rather with an intimacy with the given in the first-person perspective, which is absent in the second person perspective, in which meanings appear as projected from a lived body over there.

As theres, those meanings appear as mere possibilities rather than actualities (e.g, the excessively hot beverage given through the expressions of another); not because the other appears as another self, whose interiority is opaque for me, but rather because the meanings of the thing are expressed in another lived body. Since that body is the there of my own experience, I can only experience those meanings by resonating with corporeal and linguistic expressions, and that defines the quality of their appearance in my own perspective. Interestingly, I incorporate the second person perspective into my own worldview. I begin to feel hatred for someone accused of violent behavior by others, even
though I have not been a direct witness. Understood in this way, the second person is not a phenomenological method by which I grasp another’s consciousness (e.g. Depraz, 2012), but a modality in which phenomena are given to consciousness.

To the extent that those meanings with a sense of otherness partake of the constitution of what is given to me, they co-constitute my perspective of the lifeworld. Co-constitution is no mere co-validation (as in Husserl, 2006-, where the world is epistemologically validated through exchange with other subjectivities); rather it is a primal constitutive experience in which other bodies participate in the givenness of the world to me. I shall consider the extent to which conscious life implies co-constitution; that is, to what extent others appear as openings to meanings of the world that I incorporate to my own.

In expressions, gestures and interaction with the world, meanings are projected through another body: in the voice that warns me not to touch the hot stove; before I experience the voice as coming from another, the voice has already made a quality emerge in the stove. When I speak to my husband, rather than perceive my husband as another, I more accurately navigate the lifeworld expressed through his words; a perspective of the lifeworld that meshes with my own, that makes my own emerge in a certain way.

In what follows, I will argue that thought insertion is an experience of the world in the second-person perspective, expressed in thought. This will take me from an explanation of the anomaly to a reflection on the constitutive structures of thought, through which it is given in either the first or second-person perspective.

**What the second-person perspective tell us about delusion of thought insertion**

In his explanation of delirium, Karl Jaspers states that it “implies a transformation in our total awareness of reality” (1997). In this way, and in accordance with what I have argued, he questions the idea that delirium ought to be circumscribed to an erroneous belief but should rather be understood in terms of the global relationship between subject and reality; to the feeling of totality, coherence, and consistency between what is given to consciousness, and not as a phenomenon that is separable to the holistic experience of the world.
This disruption of coherence and consistency has been studied as a disruption of the general temporal structure of thought, which would explain the experience of loss of control, as Parnas, et.al (2005) argue. However, this happens, in other phenomena such as mind-wandering (Petrolini, 2020) and rumination in OCD experiences (Moore, 2016), although these are completely different phenomena. Certainly, thought insertion is related to a lack of control over some thoughts, but the phenomenological differences between having an obsessive thought and an inserted one are evident.

A key difference is the feeling of alienness, of lack of familiarity in inserted thoughts. According to the patient descriptions it seems that certain thoughts are experienced as not-familiar because they stray from a link between subject and reality that other kinds of thought preserve, such as those of mind-wandering, or obsessive rumination. Although the patient has lost control over, these latter thoughts participate in the structure of meaning in which thoughts considered to belong to the thinker are expressed, even if their occurrence is not under the patient’s control. For example, in rumination, the obsessive thoughts are coherent with a patient’s regular, anxious, way of dealing with the world, even though the patient has a feeling of lack of control over them.

I posit that the reality expressed in certain thoughts causes the patient to experience them in the second-person perspective. This contrasts with the primal experience of thought contents being given in the first-person perspective. Thoughts in the second person perspective contrast with those that are consistent with the historic relations of the subject and the world.

Since in an inserted thought some meanings of a lifeworld are given in another body, they are given as merely noticed (as opposed to a fully transparent experience of that which is given to me in my own lifeworld- this difference will become clearer as we proceed). This noticing is not explained merely by the fact that the voice in question is perceived from the outside -as if the difference between alien thoughts and my own were based upon material qualities, which is certainly not the case-; it has to do with the fact that the voice expresses a different lifeworld from my own, even though this voice is, paradoxically, within me: and this even accounts for a different materiality in the alien voices. When an inner voice asks the patient to kill himself, that voice rings foreign, not merely because of
its tone or volume, but rather because that tone or volume, together with the meaning of the words, bring forth a different lifeworld. In a single declarative or imperative sentence, another’s voice brings forth different habitualities, historicities and horizons of meaning, rooted in a different living body.

It is important to specify that, although the alien voice or alien thought is experienced from within (and, in that sense, we could say that the thought or inner voice is spatially “here”; indeed, in the very place where one’s own thinking occurs) it is experienced as corresponding to another body. In Husserl (1989a) and Merleau-Ponty (2012) the body appears as the Nullpunkt of experience. First-person and second-person experiences are related to indexicality (personal conscious life occurs “here” and second person experiences “there”) and this has to do with the placement of the bodies (mine is “here”, other bodies are “there”). Whereas the spatial nature of experience is related to the perspective in which normal experience is given, in the pathology, another may occupy the physical position of my own body. The spatial “here” does not correspond to the experiential “here”, that is, to what is in accordance with my own history and the meanings I have given to the world.

What makes inserted thought alien is that, in what is expressed is apprehended an alien lifeworld– and therefore it is experienced as coming from “there” although it occurs in in the spatial “here”. The experience is disquieting precisely because, although I do not perceive a voice, it points to the experiences of another, which usually only happens when I perceive another’s voice. There is something in inserted thought that implies a disintegration of my own lifeworld; therefore, this delusion is connected to the problem of the constitution of the unity of lived body and world, and not merely to the problem of mine-ness.

What distinguishes inserted thoughts from ordinary thoughts is neither an intrinsic quality of the inner voice, nor our incapacity to control them; rather, it is the lifeworld they express. When we say that a voice or facial expression is experienced in the second person, it is precisely because, rather than pointing us to another mind, this expression is pointing us towards the meanings given to the world by another body.
Thinking, like perceiving, is a way in which a lifeworld is expressed. Through inner language (which does not have quite the same structure as verbalized language, see Ratcliffe, 2017), thought brings forth a world, not only through the meaning of the words but in the way things are expressed. And as expressing a world, thinking appears with a first-person quality of intimacy, which does not require an additional reflexive consciousness.

Let us turn to thoughts that are considered alien or inauthentic. It is not clear that inserted thoughts always appear with the materiality of a voice that is heard; or that inserted thoughts are always produced by a source that can be clearly identified (Heriksen, et. al, 2019, p. 5). Therefore, we must inquire into the constitutive dynamics of inserted thoughts and on what it means, in a fundamental sense, to experience a thought as alien.

What is disquieting about a thought such as “You have to kill yourself”, is that such a statement brings forth several internally related meanings that contrast with the historicity of the patient’s experiences. The statement – in a given tone or volume- brings forth an affective atmosphere, a set of images, of meanings related to life and death, that contrast with the patient’s lifeworld, that are incoherent with her own unity of world and lived body. “You have to kill yourself” is an expression that contains several meanings that are not those of my lived body: self-hatred, a tendency to solve problems through violence, a familiarity with guns etc., are meanings that are not directly given to me in the here. For example, in Steele and Berman (2001) what the voices in inserted thought say contrast with the introversion and shyness of the patient (see also Ratcliffe, 2017). What is unusual about such thoughts is the contrast between the first-person lifeworld and the affective experiences and meanings associated with the inserted thought. For example, “Kill God” in a patient that is peaceful and would normally find the idea of murdering God unthinkable, or in an atheist patient.

Patient reports are congruent with what I have proposed. Thoughts are reported as inauthentic: “It’s just like my mind working, but it isn’t”; “it is like hearing someone else’s voice in my head, generally saying something that doesn’t “sound” like my own thoughts or interior monologue” (my emphasis). Thought insertion would be similar to the experiences of schizophrenics, or those induced by psychoactive substances (Shannon,
2003) in which part of the body’s sensibility is lost, or there is a reflective feeling that the body goes its own way separate from the mind (as in the delusion of control, Krueger and Henriksen, 2016).

As an example, if I am thinking about going grocery shopping and am thinking about what to get, I experience these thoughts as my own because they are linked to my own historical lifeworld, in which a concrete supermarket, some concrete products, etc., are linked in a meaningful whole: my lifeworld, mentally expressed. This lifeworld has a certain affective atmosphere: I may be thinking I will wait for my husband so he can help me, but then I am annoyed that perhaps he will come home too late, and the store will be closed. Now imagine that, in the same tone that I think about grocery shopping I think “I should go to the supermarket and kill everyone”, or I start dancing: certainly, such actions would not correspond to the whole experience of myself as embedded in a particular situation; therefore, I constitute them as alien.

**Conclusions**

The theory of thought insertion presented here has four main conclusions:

1) In a normal experience, what is expressed in thinking appears as given in the first-person perspective because it is completely available (where availability means that thoughts are related to the historical unity of my lived body and the world as it is given to me). Here is not a spatial property of thoughts, but an experiential sense of thoughts related to my lifeworld. Thinking about shopping, the supermarket I usually go to, and even the annoyance at my husband’s working late, are all linked as nodes in a network which constitutes my lifeworld. On the contrary, what is expressed in inserted thought is not completely available; therefore, it is experienced as corresponding to a different, and inaccessible, historicity; and this is what gives it the quality of being in the second-person perspective.

2) Thought insertion is explained by the presence of a second person perspective, rather than a loss or alteration of sense of agency. There is a widely accepted explanation of thought insertion as based on the loss or lack of sense of agency (see table 1). However, it seems that such a lack of agency is shared with other experiences such as mind wandering.
Both wandering and inserted thoughts appear as disconnected from the flow of experience; but while wandering thoughts always lack control, this is not a rule in thought insertion; according to the literature, inserted thoughts are generally controlled, although the locus of control seems unrelated to the self. Wandering thoughts are related with one’s own lifeworld (however messily); on the contrary, inserted thoughts are related to a different lifeworld, and therefore, are experienced in a second-person perspective.

3) If we look into the intentional (and constitutive) structure of delusional consciousness we may find some elements that alien thoughts share with other intersubjective experiences. According to Merleau-Ponty (2012) the qualities of language, like bodily expressions, are manifestations of consciousness. Steele and Berman point out, for example, that the voices that call for suicide do it in an irascible or mocking tone. The aggressiveness associated with this kind of expression, a cold and cutting tone of voice, is a characteristic that I not only identify with an alien voice, but that is alien precisely because what is expressed through it comes with a particular affective atmosphere. I might say the same thing in a jocular tone of voice, but the irascible tone makes it clear that it is produced by another. In this patient, social anxiety and thoughts related to fear of others are given in the first person, while prosodically derisive voices appear as opposed to such feelings; they do not come from here but from there.

4) In order to understand inserted thoughts, we should focus on how their strangeness is experienced. It is easier to describe the intimacy or mineness of our ordinary thoughts than it is to explore otherness in thoughts, because it is an unusual occurrence outside of psychotic experiences. In order to overcome that challenge, it is necessary to interview patients in such a way that what is alien about inserted thoughts is brought to light. Rather than asking whether a thought appears to come from the outside or from within, or whether the patient has control over the thought, the interviewer should invite the patient to articulate what it is that he finds strange about what is expressed in inserted thoughts. Rather than asking whether “Kill God” was an outside voice or an inner thought, the interviewer should ask if the occasion, tone, and general affective atmosphere of such a thought feels right, allowing the patient to explore the way in which such a thought is alien to his own lifeworld. This is in accordance with classical views of psychopathology, such
as that offered by Jaspers (1997), who recognized that delirium should be seen in terms of a disruption of the relation between subject and reality, and not as a phenomenon that can be isolated from the broader life experience.

**References**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of the experience</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Authors</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) Emphasis Certain thoughts are experienced as</td>
<td>A problem in the metarepresentational</td>
<td>Frith (1992)</td>
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<td>either on the lack or in the alteration of self-experience over inserted thoughts.</td>
<td>separate from the normal flow of consciousness. It is felt that these thoughts are not produced by the person who experiences them (there is no sense of agency).</td>
<td>observation mechanism, which determines agency.</td>
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<td>Certain thoughts are experienced as being produced within oneself (sense of ownership) but not by oneself (no sense of agency).</td>
<td>An alteration in the temporal stream of consciousness.</td>
<td>Gallagher (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a loss of self-consciousness in some thoughts.</td>
<td>An alteration in the temporal stream of consciousness.</td>
<td>Parnas, Møller, Kircher, Thalbitzer, Jansson, Handest &amp; Zahavi (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upon reflection, some thoughts appear associated to the self, and others to a non-self.</td>
<td>Whereas the sense of for-me-ness of certain thoughts is not lost, it is somehow affected.</td>
<td>Henriksen, Parnas &amp; Zahavi (2019)</td>
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2) Emphasis on the otherness of inserted thoughts

<table>
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<tr>
<th>There is an experience of another self distinct from the authentic self. This leads to self–other confusion and delusional misattribution.</th>
<th>Intersubjectivity: a splitting of the self. The sense of “being-with-others is replaced by a sense of detachment that may pass over into a threatening alienation”.</th>
<th>Roy (2017)</th>
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<td>Fuchs, &amp; Röhricht (2017).</td>
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3) Emphasis on the content of inserted thoughts

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Thought is experienced as an intentional state different from thinking.</th>
<th>Subpersonal mechanisms (psychological)</th>
<th>Ratcliffe (2017)</th>
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Table 1. Explanations for the delusion of thought insertion from phenomenological approaches.