

Genetic phenomenology and potentiality: a new insight to the theory of empathy in Husserl*

Michael D. Barber S. J. **

St. Louis University

Recibido: 19 de septiembre de 2009 • **Aprobado:** 19 de octubre de 2009

Abstract

The following article has a main objective to re-read the theory of Empathy (Einfühlung) by Edmund Husserl, through an analysis of the concept of analogic apprehension, since the critics by Alfred Schutz on his text *The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity in Husserl*.

Key words: Husserl, Empathy, analogic apprehension, genetic phenomenology, body.

* Este artículo pertenece a la investigación sobre la Fenomenología Social en Alfred Schutz que viene realizando Michael Barber desde 1985, año en el cual se titula como Doctor en Filosofía de Yale University, con la disertación *El lugar de la sociología del conocimiento en la fenomenología de Alfred Schutz*.

** Ph.D., Yale University. Master of Divinity Loyola University Chicago. M.G. in Philosophy St Louis University. Profesor del Departamento de Filosofía de la St. Louis University. El profesor Barber ha publicado numerosos libros y artículos, principalmente en torno al pensamiento de Alfred Schutz, la fenomenología, ética y asuntos relacionados con la interculturalidad. Es miembro asociado del Círculo Latinoamericano de Fenomenología (CLAFEN). Correo electrónico: barbermd@slu.edu

Fenomenología genética y potencialidad: una nueva mirada a la teoría de la empatía en Husserl

Resumen

El presente artículo tiene como propósito principal hacer una relectura de la teoría de la empatía (*Einfühlung*) de Edmund Husserl, a través de un análisis del concepto de aprensión analógica, a partir de las críticas de Alfred Schutz en su texto *El problema de la intersubjetividad trascendental en Husserl*.

Palabras clave: Husserl, empatía, aprensión analógica, fenomenología genética, cuerpo.

Phénoménologie génétique et potentialité: une nouvelle vision à la théorie de l'empathie chez Husserl

Résumé

Cet article a pour but principal faire une nouvelle lecture de la théorie de l'empathie (Einführung) de Edmund Husserl, moyennant une analyse du concept d'appréhension analogique, à partir des critiques d'Alfred Schutz dans son écrit "Le problème de l'intersubjectivité transcendantale chez Husserl".

Mots clés : Husserl, empathie, appréhension analogique, phénoménologie génétique, corps.

Introduction¹

Edmund Husserl's theory of empathy (*Einfühlung*) has come under serious fire from various quarters. Although Alfred Schutz criticizes Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation on various counts (e.g., the impossibility of the second *epoché* and the appresentation of the fully concrete other) in his 1958 essay "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," for the purposes of this paper, would like to focus on just one of his criticisms, that of Husserl's "analogical apperception" Schutz succinctly summarizes his criticism as follows:

Husserl's assumption that an analogical apprehension of an Other's living body takes place on the basis of a similarity to my own living body contradicts the phenomenological finding that my living body "stands out" in my primordial perceptual field in a manner which is fundamentally different from the manner in which the allegedly similar body of the Other stands out in this field. (Schutz, 1966, pp. 63-64).

What is curious is that Husserl, if one considers his *Nachlass* writings published in 1973 as *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, to which Schutz lacked access, showed himself thoroughly aware of both elements: the fundamental different ways in which my and other's body is given to me and the analogical apprehension of the other on the basis of similarity. Not only that, Husserl mentions both elements *on the same page* in the *Nachlass* writings (from a manuscript dated 1914-1915) without seeing any contradiction. On that single page, he mentions the similarity between the other's body (*Körper*) and my lived body (*Leibkörper*), but then two paragraphs down admits that the types "own body" and "other's body" are not the same because "one's own body is uniquely distinguished by its mode of appearance" (Edmund, 1973, p. 325). It is hard to imagine that Husserl was not astute enough to recognize what Schutz took to be a contradiction prohibiting the analogical transfer, and so the question arises why for Husserl the dissimilarity between the way our bodies are given to me does not block the analogical apprehension. I will argue that there are two reasons: 1) that Husserl in the *Nachlass* writings must be understood to be employing often a genetic phenomenology rather than

¹ From herceforth, all referentes to the *Husserliana* series will be abbreviated "Hua".

a static phenomenology—a distinction that is not clearly upheld in *Cartesian Meditations 5*, which is Schutz's target, that has only become more explicit in the years after Schutz's writings, and that makes visible a different approach to empathy than that the transcendental constitution of the other within the static phenomenology that Husserl claims characterizes the Fifth Meditation. 2) This genetic phenomenology reconstructively recovers a *mundane* (rather than transcendental) subject continually, immediately, pervasively, unselfconsciously, and relatively unconstrainedly projecting before itself into the world possibilities, but in a way that is not entirely arbitrary either. It should be noted at the outset that although the *Nachlass* represent different periods of Husserl's work (from 1905-1935) and even different approaches to the question of empathy, as Ichiro Yamaguchi shows, this paper will draw on diverse passages to present hopefully what be a unified account of Husserl's genetic approach to intersubjectivity, in much the way that Julia Iribarne attempted to develop a unified outline of Husserl's entire theory of intersubjectivity (Yamaguchi, 1982, p. 88)².

Having clarified the genetic approach to empathy and the distinctive subjectivity it uncovers, I will turn to the criticism that David Carr raises against Husserl's theory of empathy, namely that it is based on perceptual intentionality, which is more appropriate for the relationship between human beings and nature than for the relationship between human beings. Carr's criticism appears in an essay critical of Schutz, entitled "Alfred Schutz and the Project of Phenomenological Social Theory," but he repeatedly generalizes his critique to the approach to empathy characteristic of phenomenology in general insofar as it prefers the model of a subject relating to an object instead of the model of participation, or membership in the same community (Carr, 1994, pp. 327-332). I will argue that Carr overlooks the genetic method Husserl deploys and the projecting, possibility-realizing subjectivity that he reconstructs. Further, I will try to demonstrate that Husserl's investigations reveal how empathy is not to be assimilated to perception but rather represents a brand new possibility of knowing (although to be sure it has been

2 Yamaguchi shows, for instance, how after 1925-1926, analogizing passive appresentation and pairing became prominent concepts. Julia Iribarne, *Husserl's Theorie der Intersubjektivität* (Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1994, p. 21).

deployed from time immemorial without having been recognized for what it is) unlike all the other types of knowing, which it resembles in various ways. Furthermore, empathy makes possible all the higher level kinds of knowing (e.g. in the social sciences) and higher level dimensions of intersubjective experience (e.g. sympathy) that Carr, it would seem, considers important. In other words empathy itself is the realization of a new possibility and it opens a door to all kinds of other cognitive possibilities.

Genetic Phenomenology

According to Julia Iribarne, Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation, despite Husserl's own claim that he was basically pursuing a static phenomenology, (Husserl, 1950, pp.136-150) also involves elements of a genetic phenomenology (Iribarne, 1994, pp. 46-47)—a point already noticed by Iso Kern and later highlighted by Nam-In Lee (Iso Kern & Iribarne, 1973, pp. 165-183). Klaus Held contends, further, that Husserl's claim in the Fifth Meditation has been taken over without sufficient discussion, despite extensive reference to genetic methodology (Held, 1972, p. 25). The purpose of static phenomenology is a philosophical-reflective grounding, or justification (*Rechtfertigung*), of the transcendental other. Its focus is not on the bodily presentation of the other, but rather on the interlocking of intentionalities, the implication of another's consciousness in one's own, particularly as this implication falls out from the "double reduction," which in the *Erste Philosophie* begins with the clarification of one's own time-consciousness that itself already contains a kind of intersubjectivity in the many different versions of my own intentionally directed self beyond the present, for example, the self remembered or anticipated in the future (Iribarne, 1994, p. 25)³. By contrast, the purpose of the genetic

3 The double reduction involves first the discovery of my own intentionality and then the discovery within that intentionality the intentionality of another. It parallels memory in which I recover in present intentionality the (past) intentionality of another "I", that is, my past "I". Of course, this is only "parallel" to empathy since the I whose intentionality I find within my own is nevertheless my own I. For this reason, the double reduction is intimately connected to intentional implication, as Iribarne observes, *Husserl's Theorie der Intersubjektivität*, 68. See also Edmund Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24)*, Zweiter Teil: *Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion*, ed. Rudolf Boehm, *Hua VIII* (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950, p. 434). See also Nicolas de Warren, "The Truth of Solipsism", an unpublished manuscript presented at the Aron Gurwitsch Lecture, at the annual meeting of the Society for *Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy*, October 30, 2009, section 2. See Held, Held, "Das Problem der Intersubjektivität und die Idee einer phänomenologischen Transzendentalphilosophie", 59n. 75.

phenomenology is to illuminate the experience of the mundane (*weltlichen*) other on the basis of exploring the pre-reflective sphere in which the intentionality bearing the other is made explicit in response to the question “what motivates empathy (*Einfühlung*),” (Held, 1972, pp. 21-23) in the sense of what experiences evoke recognition of the other. The genetic perspective, taking as its guide (*Leitfaden*) the already formed structures that static phenomenology illuminates, constructively sets about uncovering layers of experience (Iribarne, 1994, pp. 70-71). Genetic analyses characteristically deal with such issues as apperception, habituality, association, reference to an originary experience in which for the first time (*Urstiftung*) an object of this or that similar meaning is constituted, and the analogizing transference to another (pp. 42-45). Indeed, the reduction to one’s primordial sphere can either be aimed at the apodeictic grounding of the knowledge and discovery of the transcendental other (in static phenomenology) or at providing a reflective context within which the non-philosophical motivation of natural empathy (discovered via genetic phenomenology) can be explored (p. 52). After the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl himself acknowledged these two types of primordially by distinguishing the primordial reduction from the solipsistic one (p. 52).

Schutz, in fact, treats Husserl’s argument for the analogical apprehension of the other as an attempt at justifying the appearance of the transcendental other within one’s own primordial sphere, that is, of making manifest those transcendental, constitutive achievements which make possible the positing of the meaning (*Sinn*) through which the other is given (p. 25)⁴. In Schutz’s view, one cannot justify the analogical apprehension of the other insofar as one’s own body is given to oneself in a way that the other’s never is. In the sphere of transcendental justification, this single major difference makes it impossible to argue without contradiction that one can transfer the sense “lived body” to the other on the basis of the similarity of the other’s body to one’s own. However, if one takes account of the genetic approach, whose appearance in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation is oblique but whose themes

4 David Carr shows that the problem is not proving the existence of the other but making phenomenological sense of other egos, David Carr, “The ‘Fifth Meditation’ and Husserl’s Cartesianism”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 19.

and issues are discussed thoroughly in Husserl's *Nachlass* writings and if one considers the possibility-realizing subject these *Nachlass* writings reveal, one can understand why the basic dissimilarity between the way my body and the other's is given fails to block the analogical transfer for Husserl—or so I hope to show.

A Response to Schutz's Objection: Genetic Phenomenology and the Subject of Potentialities

In *Nachlass* discussions of the genetic origins of our experience, Husserl is clear that to complete a perceptual experience of a thing once is to complete a type of conscious activity that contains within itself an infinity of motivated possibilities for future experience in the sense that similar expectations will be "motivated" (Edmund, 1973, p. 357) (rather than caused) the next time one is confronted with that thing. As is typical of Husserl's approach, the future thing is not taken as a stimulus causally effecting the reactivation of past experience, as a naturalistic account might explain it, but rather, in order to abide within we *experience* the world, Husserl describes how the experienced thing evokes or "motivates" the application of previous acquisitions (Husserl, 1952, pp. 212-247). It is basic to conscious experience, in Husserl's view, that one comes "to expect something similar, to bring to bear similar presumptions, under similar circumstances" (Husserl, *Husserliana* XIII, p.45). Things, then, in the mundane world are experienced according to their types (Husserl, *Husserliana* XIV, p. 497 y XV, p. 58, 221 y 620). Husserl amplifies on the non-theoretical dimensions of what we bring to perception, which make up "ad-perception" (Aguirre, 1970, p.157) and on the genetic origins of such apperception:

According to analogy "I expect that when I will again experience something in the now, it will happen. All apperceptive contexts rest on "experience" and thereby on "analogy." I do not, however, make in general experiential inferences or analogical inferences. Nevertheless I can always say: I have already experienced something analogous, otherwise I would not be able to grasp [what I am now experiencing]. Analogical experience is the presupposition, the condition of the possibility of future apperception. Such (future) experience

can only arise when experiences of a certain type have already occurred. The past defines the future. This is an a priori law of genesis (Husserl, 1973, *Hua.* XIII, p. 345 y XIV p.14).

References to the genetic origins of apperception also appear in sections of the Fourth Cartesian Mediation, although there the focus is on the genetic constitution of the ego, as opposed to things, and the passages there are more clearly designated as dealing with the genetic constitution, as opposed to the rather undifferentiated blending of genetic and static phenomenology in the Fifth Meditation. In those sections of the Fourth Meditation, for instance, Husserl speaks of how the ego's positing and explicating being sets up a habituality within the ego or how everything known points back to an original becoming acquainted, a "primal instituting" (Husserl, 1973, p.102) as is exemplified by the child who first comes to understand what scissors are and automatically applies the concept to future instances (Husserl, Husserliana, 1973, p.141). It should be emphasized, however, that Husserl's denial in the above quotation that no "inferences" are involved in analogizing apperception points to the fact for him analogical expectations of the similar under similar circumstances are usually not based on cognitive deliberations, but often happen almost automatically according to laws of passive association without the ego's deliberate collaboration (*ohne Ichaktivität*) (Husserl, 1973, *Hua.* XIV, p.119). These expectations, which can be confirmed or disappointed in the unfolding course of experience, show how one's past fund of experience is not inert but equips one with possibilities to project oneself toward the world, even if one's apperception on occasion "shoots beyond its appropriate limits" (Husserl, *Hua.* XV, 1973, p. 252).

Given that we engage in automatic analogizing apperception constantly with things, it comes as no surprise that a similar process is deployed in regard to knowing others through immediate, unreflective *Einfühlung* (*Hua.* XIV, p. 486). When discussing how an example of such analogizing apperception takes place, Husserl (in *Hua* XIII) comments on how I see the other's hand which I grasp in outer perception as like my own hand, namely with reference to its material "thingliness" (*Körperlichkeit*); it is a thing of the same kind as my hand (*Hua.* XII, p. 46). Continuing this exposition, Husserl proceeds to discuss how I next, in response to the other's hand, experience *my own* hand, namely

as a bearer of field of sensations and capacities for movement, and he then adds that the other's hand is grasped, *as a result*, not merely as a material thing, but "as a hand," but still it is not a member of my lived body (*Leibes*) (*Hua.* XII, p. 46). Nevertheless, because of the similarity of the other's hand to mine the physicality of the hand is posited (*hineingesetzt*) in connection with a lived bodiliness (*Leiblichkeit*) and with all that belongs to it (*Hua.* XII, p. 46). Husserl goes beyond this experience of another's hand to suggest that the *whole* other, who is physically (*körperlichen*) similar to me, is presented not only as a physical thing. Because his body is similar to my living body (*Leibkörper*) and reminds of it, he appresents a lived bodiliness (*Leiblichkeit*), which consists in an innerliness that accompanies his physical outerliness and that is similar to my own. This similarity grounds the transfer of sense (*Hua.* XIV, p. 489).

It should be kept in mind, however, that these repeated references to the idea that the other appears "not merely" as a physical (*körperliche*) thing is meant to imply that that the other's physical *Körper* constitutes a lower stratum of a living body (*Leibes*) and that we do not experience in temporal sequence first the other's physical *Körper* and *then* add on to it to produce a lived body. Although the foreign body is given as a thing whose bodiliness (*Leiblichkeit*) is analogically appresented, Husserl admits in the same breath that this "thing" carries with it the comprehended level (*Auffassungsschichte*) of "another's body (*fremder Leib*)" (Husserl, *Hua.* XIV, 1973, p. 489). I see the other's body in the same way that I see as sign pointing the way or a word, that is, not as merely physical objects but as beings already suffused with their higher level meanings (*Hua.* XIV, p. 489). As Husserl puts it, "I see not only the other physical body, I see the other man" (*Hua.* XII, 1973, p. 340) and he is clear that an "abstraction" is involved when I set aside the other whom I understand and, instead, focus upon the other as a mere physical (*körperlichen*) thing (*Ding*) (*Hua.*, 1973, XV, p. 506). The best way to explain these distinct strata that do not appear separately is through the idea of the genetic constitutive method, which distinguishes strata that are already thoroughly blended with each other in the experience for which it seeks to give a genetic explanation.

It also needs to be stressed that according to the pattern of analogical apperception with reference to knowing others, as in the case of apperception with things, the transference of “lived bodiliness” happens immediately and is not a matter of arriving at a theoretical conclusion (*Hua.*, XIII, p. 431). The metaphor of something “reminding” me of something else captures this non-theorizing transfer since it is a matter of the other’s body and its movements, such as adjusting to perceive something or shoving or resisting something else, reminding me through passive association of my own originally given body and thereby “wakening” me to my own originally given body (*Hua.* XIV, p. 529). Thus, for example, upon seeing another’s hand, I feel my own hand; if the other moves her hand, so my hand “itches” (*Hua.*, XIII, p. 311) (*juckt*) to move. Similarly, the other’s governing in his body reminds me of my governing ego and his movements, which resemble my own, remind me of the inner appearances my movement would have if I would make a similar movement from the other’s position. More is involved than seeing a similarity between mere things or the between the behavior of mere things insofar as the lived body of the other, reminding me of my lived body, seems to act in relationship to its context in the way I would react to that context, as is evident when the other’s lived body withdraws from what would stir up fear in me or when the other is attracted to or repulsed by a certain food (in the ways that food can affect me also). Apperception of this kind involves no conclusion or act of thinking, just as the child does not have to think back to his first experience of scissors to recognize the scissors facing him, as Husserl tells us. Rather, ego and alter ego enter into an associative synthesis of pairing (*Paarung*), a passive, two-sided (*wechselseitige*) transfer, at one stroke, without reflection (*Hua.* XV, p. 252)⁵. It is in connection with such pairing between my body and the other’s that Husserl makes the point that simple analogical apperception, which is also at work in our repeated experience of things, is capable of shooting beyond its legitimate limits. Analogical apprehension, whether in the case of things or bodily others like ourselves, reveals our tendencies as a subject to project expectations derived from past experiences upon whatever is given to us in the present, not arbitrarily but insofar as it is similar to what we experienced in the past.

5 See Yamaguchi (1982, p. 94).

On the genetic level, we project such similarity-based expectations without reflection and certainly without the kind of rational caution that according to Schutz prohibits the transfer of the sense “lived body” to the other on the plane of a transcendental justification within a static phenomenology.

Obviously the analogical apperceptive transfer of the sense “lived body” that is evoked by the other’s similarity with my body, would be impossible if I lacked fundamental experience of being thoroughly and intimately familiar with my own lived body, the primal instituting, that makes possible the sense-transfer (*Hua.* XIII, p. 337, y I, p. 141). The other, who reminds me of my own body whose sense I then transfer analogically to the other, represents then a variation of my own ego as governing in its body, and if I did not have a body, the other would disappear from the circle of my appearances. The other, spoken of by Husserl as a “modalization” of myself, looks back genetically, as does every modalization, to that which it modalizes (*Hua.* XV, p. 614 y XIX, p. 14 y p. 460). Without a body, one would be unable to “see” others since the perception of one’s own body is the fundament for the perception of the other’s. Husserl is quick to point out, though, that this does not imply that I make an inference from my body to the other’s or that my own body is the focus of my attention, only that my own body must be “perceptively conscious (*perzeptiv bewusst*)” to me, whether noticed or thematized or not, in order for the transfer to occur. The focus, it would seem, is on transferring the sense “lived body” to the other’s body without making my body focal, however presuppositional it may be to the transference (*Hua.* XIII, p. 267). This kind of extroversion may explain why it is that Husserl states that “‘Self-alienation’ (*Selbstentfremdung*) can be called the achievement of empathy” (*Hua.* XV, p. 634).

Of course, that one must resort to analogical apperception to know the other instead of just perceiving the other directly is itself an indication that there is something distinctive (*etwas Ausgezeichnetes*) (Husserl, *Husserliana*, 1973, XV, p. 274) about my body, which appears differently than the “other body.” In the first place, the perceptions and experiences of my own body are given to me directly, “originarily,” but I do not have access to the other’s experiences in this way and it is impossible in principle that I ever will—hence I must rely

upon apperception and transferences to gain access to the other (*Hua. XV*, p. 50 y p. 343). In Husserl's terms, the other is "presentified" (*vergegenwärtigt*) but not presented (*gegenwärtigt*) (*Hua. XV*, p. 343). Another way of highlighting this difference between my body and the other's is that in my experience of my body, above all, it seems centered about my "here" (*Hua. XV*, p. 325). My body is always here, my head is always touchable though it can never be circled or completely seen, and other things are located to the right or left or behind of me. In other words, things are given to my perspective as the perspective of my distinctive (*ausgezeichneten*) null-point of orientation to which all other bodies and things are given, with none of them sharing that null-point with me (*Hua. XV*, pp. 274-329). I never occupy the other's null-point of orientation. In order to capture how it is that we get access to the other's original sphere, Husserl explain that the other's consciousness is only "appresented" (*Hua. XIV*, p. 482 y *XIII*, p. 374) in an analogous way to the manner in which one perspective of a thing points to a backside that is not present by still announced (*bekundet*) (*Hua. XIII*, p. 374) through the presented perspective. As Husserl puts it, "I find, however, the other's bodiliness in secondary experience, as co-perceived, indicated, but not experienceable by me myself (*nicht von mir selbst erfahrbar*)" (*Hua. XIV*, p. 350)⁶. Of course, the very use of the term "appresentation" originally used with regard to one side of a thing appresenting another side, is applied metaphorically when used with reference to the other's consciousness since the appresented side of a thing can eventually come to perceptual givenness, but the appresented original sphere of the other can never be originally given to me, as Husserl readily acknowledges (*Hua. XV*, pp. 101-102).

It is significant that in this regard, Husserl repeatedly affirms that the similarity between the other's body and my own makes possible the transfer of sense "lived body" to the other, while also admitting the basic difference, namely, that I never have direct, originary access to the other. Hence, since my body is given to me in a different way than the other's ever is or can be, I never have the other's originary experience of her body, even though the supposed simi-

6 De Warren's insightful discussion of touching in which touching the other is something that differs from touching a table or touching my own hands would still, it seems, depend on analogical transfer insofar as I feel the other's touching me back when touching her, but not with originary experience and hence empathy is required, see de Warren, *The Truth of Solipsism* (section 4).

larity between our bodies warrants the sense-transfer-precisely the problem on which Schutz focuses. Repeatedly, Husserl highlights in the same place, even on the same page as we have seen above, that the exceptional way in which my body appears (*die ganz exzeptionelle Erscheinungsweise meines Leibes*) can coexist and be experienced in tandem with an apperceptive transfer based on the likeness and similarity of my body with that of others (*Hua. XV, pp. 661-655*). Both seem to coexist, as the example of my noticing the other hand shows. I see another's hand as like mine and analogically apperceive it as the hand of a living body, but when I see it touched and at the same time experience my own hand as feeling nothing in my originary sphere, I still continue to consider it a "hand" even though I have no originary experience of what it experiences originally when touched (*Hua. XIV, p. 242*). In other words, the similarity is maintained despite my being denied any originary access to the other's hand.

This paradoxical situation even affects the understanding of analogical apperception itself. Husserl argues that in the simple customary apperception according to analogy, a newly perceived tree is a tree just as the previously perceived one was, so I should be able to say that the newly perceived body is a body originally perceived as my own body is, but of course it isn't and it is impossible that it ever should be. Husserl then seems to be admitting at this point that this analogical apperception of another's lived body does not therefore follow the usual pattern of apperception according to analogy (*einfach eine gewöhnliche Apperzeption nach Analogie*) (*Hua. XIV, p. 490*). It is precisely the originaryity of my own body's givenness in contrast with the way the other is given to me that brings it about that here even the method of analogical apperception must be bent and twisted a bit to accommodate this anomalous situation. One might say, if you will, that when it comes to the analogical apperception of two bodies even the notion of analogical apperception is being used analogically. The interesting thing is that even though Husserl repeatedly recognizes such difficulties and envisions the possibility that there might be only degrees of similarity (*Hua. XIV, p. 531*) or even contradictions on some level involved in such analogical apperception (p. 497) he nevertheless allows, as Schutz complains that he should not, that the transference takes place.

Here I will articulate what I take to be three reasons why Husserl in his *Nachlass* writings has such confidence in the analogical apperceptive transfer of the sense “lived body” to the other and why he believes that the transfer cannot be blocked due to the lack of original experience of the other. The first has to do with overwhelming number and pervasiveness of ways in which similarity grounds the transference—something that becomes clearer in the three volumes on intersubjectivity than in the highly condensed argument of the *Cartesian Meditations*. There is first of all a similarity between the physical appearances of my body and the other to whom the sense “lived body” is transferred, especially our various organs, but this similarity is not only a matter of physical resemblance, as if we were merely things similar to each other, but it also has to do with how those organs function as part of a whole bodily organ system that functions like our bodily system, as Husserl suggest in his discussion of how we observe the other governing (*Walten*) in his or her body in the *Cartesian Meditations* (*Hua.* I, pp. 146-151). Higher species, such as apes, remind me of myself and evoke the transference of “lived body” insofar as they possess and function with hands and feet, organs for grasping things (*Greiforganen*), as even lower species can do insofar as they exhibit sensitivity in their skin and appropriate reaction-movements, such as the quivering of the skin when pricked, as happens with us, or the wrinkling of the forehead upon being touched or struck (*Hua.* XIV, p. 118). The behavior of the other lived body can elicit the transfer insofar as I am reminded of my lived body by: its valuing; striving; acting; grasping according to right or left, before or after; shoving; bumping up against; touching; carrying; doing; suffering; being pained by bright sunlight; acting; reacting; retreating before an object of fear; being attracted to food; eating; producing the violent movements and shrieking voice that are indicative of anger; achieving ends; seeing; and judging or speaking out (the latter two being particularly human) (*Hua.* XIV, pp. 83-284 y pp. 500-508).

Denying that empathy (*Einfühlung*) occurs in the infant’s satisfying of her desires at her mother’s breast, Husserl argues that it first appears when one is to a degree aware of the independence of one’s body and is able to share a common world especially through speech and through the naming of common things (*Hua.* XV, p. 605). In this triangulation among the other, myself,

and objects in the world and in the other's (often linguistic) coordination with me in relation to such objective things, the other's behavior toward objects reminds me of my own body and effects the subsequent transferring of sense. Husserl provides a specific example of such triangulation and the consequent transfer of sense when he describes how I watch the other move in the presence of the lake or a house that we both are in the presence of together, as she directs her eyes to the object, assumes various particular positions with reference to it, and exhibits a particular facial mien (*Hua. XIV*, pp. 499-545). Although it is certainly case than once we have attributed the sense "lived body" to another we anticipate that we will react similarly to our common world, Husserl here is suggesting that our shared reactions to a common world provide a powerful impetus to make the sense transfer in the first place (*Hua. XIV*, p. 14). In summary, there are so many subtle and pervasive occurrences, objects, or indications that remind us of our own bodiliness and that prompt us to transfer without any deliberation the sense "lived" body to the other that it comes as no surprise that the recognition that I do not have originary access to the other seems rather impotent to block the transfers.

Although Schutz might object that several of the above perceived similarities might reflect cultural standards of normality (e.g. anger might be expressed differently in another culture), the point of Schutz's objection is that to make use of such standards violates the methodological confinement to the sphere properly of one's own that the second *epoché* requires (Schutz, 1966, p. 66). If Husserl, though, is involved in a genetic reconstruction of the mundane subject, the constraints of a static, transcendental constitution would not necessarily apply, and it would not be at all strange that the types through which we analogically apperceive similar objects are either socio-culturally transmitted or that socio-cultural influences leave their mark on the primarily instituting experience that is the basis of future apperceptions. For instance, it is perfectly plausible that the child's first experience of scissors might also involve a parent designating the perceived object as "a pair of scissors," thereby bequeathing to the child a part of the parent's socio-cultural, linguistic heritage. Furthermore, although different cultures might express anger differently, for example, it still would be quite plausible, given our wide

experiences of different cultures and even animals, that violent movement and shrieks in anger-producing contexts (which would have to be perceived as similar to other anger-producing contexts) would ground at least quite widely a transfer of the sense “lived body” to one expressing such movements and shrieks in an appropriate (anger-eliciting) setting.

Given the fact that we seem to transfer the sense “lived body” quite extensively and automatically in the face of the wide-ranging similarities that remind us of our own bodiliness and provoke the transfer regardless of our lack of originary access, one might think that such transferences are rather arbitrary. Indeed, this fact may explain why Klaus Held, focusing on the experience of the other, “as if I were there,” to be discussed below, objects that as long as one lack originary experience of the other and engages in a non-positional phantasy regarding the other’s conscious experience, one will never be able to escape one’s own primordiality, even when that phantasy seems to find confirmation in the congruent behaviors of the other’s positionally experienced and seems to pass into over into “positionality” (Held, 1972, pp. 39-43). Held summarizes his argument by citing Husserl himself, “from mere phantasy there is no way into actuality” (p. 42). Or the automatic nature of the transfers may explain why Dorion Cairns thought that Husserl’s view implied a kind of animism insofar as we tend to project “lived body” everywhere, even onto inanimate objects until we gradually come to recognize their inanimate character (pp. 34-48). However Antonio Aguirre has it right when he affirms that for Husserl the transference of “lived body” is not a matter of pure phantasy (*puren Phantasie*) (*Hua. XV*, p. 251), in which an image points beyond itself to a fictive world, since empathy is grounded on the other’s actual physical body (*Körper*) which I see and which does not point beyond itself to a fictive world (*Hua. XIV*, pp. 91-100). Furthermore, as Husserl himself states, my psychic processes and activities, which I am referred to by the motivating experience of the other’s body being similar to my own and which play an intermediary role in the transference of “lived body” to the other, do not function as intermediary images for the lived body of the other, but rather are apperceptive “clues” (*Anhalt*) (pp.163-164). Aguirre shows convincingly that a phantasy-like (*phantasiemässige*) (*Hua. XV*, p. 251) process is at play in empathy that deals with real, motivated possibilities,

anchored in actuality, as opposed to empty, non-motivated possibilities of pure phantasy (Aguirre, pp. 155-162). Furthermore, the transfer of sense continues to undergo fulfilling, or disconfirming, experiences that prevent them from belonging to the domain of “mere” phantasy, characterized as it is by arbitrariness and unconstrained freedom (p. 156).

In fact, Husserl recognizes that since we are unable to have originary experience of the other’s psychic life, we must have recourse to another method of validation, with its own style of establishing correctness or incorrectness (*ihren eigenen Stil des Stimmens und Nichtstimmens*) and that proceed in the manner of fulfillment (*Erfüllung*) (*Hua*, XV, p. 84). It is the course of continued experience that confirms one’s appresentation of consciousness and the sense “lived body” to the other—and hence, as Georg Römpp observes, the recognition of similarity is not a one time occurrence, but takes place in a process of co-expectations and fulfillment which makes up moments of the complex structure of empathy (Römpp, 1992, p. 86). Where disconfirmation occurs, the other ceases to behave as a lived body and one’s appresentation is modalized to becoming destroyed or doubtful insofar as the other turns out to be, for example, a wooden or wax puppet, which in some aspects reminds me of a lived body, even though there is not actual human being or psychophysical essence there (*Hua*, XIV, p. 124). While allowing for disconfirmation, Husserl, nevertheless, speaks of the reasonableness of the positing of the other I, its continual (*immerfort, beständig*) confirmation; of the “unbroken (*ungebrochen*)” “certainty of the existence of this human being there (*die Daseinsgewissheit etwa dieses Menschen dort*)” (*Hua*, XV, p. 95); and of the subject-character of the other as being irrefutably (*unweigerlich*) given (Husserl, *Husserliana*, 1973, XV, p. 447). If the pervasive similarities evoking transference spoken of above are in place, one can imagine how my transferences are constantly and massively confirmed every time an animal grasps an object as I would or avoids me as I would it or every time a human being speaks as I would, expresses understandable feeling in accord with a situation, or corresponds appropriately with my actions in assorted situations. The massive confirming evidence constitutes a second reason as to why most of the time I readily transfer the sense “lived body” to others, despite my awareness on some level that I lack originary access

to the other. The cases of wooden or wax puppets are few and far between; and the repeated transference/projection of one's lived body on to others beyond the boundary that the lack of originary access might impose seems, fortunately, appropriate.

A third reason for bypassing the lack of originary access has to do with the impressive force that similarity makes upon us. In *Hua* XIV, Husserl provides us with particular clarity a pattern of thinking that appears repeatedly but less clearly in the other passages scattered throughout his work and that exhibits how similarity evokes a transfer of the sense "lived body," even before one makes explicit one's lack of originary access to the other (*Hua*. XIV, pp. 242-376). In *Beilage* XXXIII, Husserl begins by asking about the similarity making possible empathy (*Einfühlung*) through reminding, and he proceeds to run through a series of similarities that remind us of our own bodiliness: the division into organs and typical outer behaviors, including touching, grasping, shoving, bumping up against, and carrying as well as appropriate responsiveness to context as is exhibited in withdrawal in the face of fear, feeling attraction or repulsion to food. These "reminding" similarities result in the transference to the analogue of a corresponding innerness which is not compresent (*kompräsentiert*) to me and which Husserl at the end of the passage admits is not his own innerness and is not experienceable for him (*Hua*. XV, pp. 283-285). In this passage, not only does the lack of originary access not block the transfer of sense lived body, but the transfer, based on wide-ranging, multiple similarities seems to take place so quickly that there isn't even a sense that there might be an obstacle, and the difference between my experience of my body and of the other's seems to be noticed only at the end, only as a kind of afterthought. Whereas the static phenomenological method begins with the isolated ego and then posits the similarities that enable the transfer, the genetic phenomenology of the *Nachlass* volumes tends to begin with the similarities and point finally to one's isolated access to one's own consciousness that does not, though, block the transfer. In addition, if one considers the example of the other's hand in *Hua* XIII, with which this section began, the similarity of the other's hand reminds me of my own with its inner field of sensations which are then transferred immediately to the other's hand, and the fact that I do not have access to the other's originary

experience does not even seem to pose a question about the transfer (*Hua. XII*, pp. 46-49). Furthermore, the transfer requires only that I be perceptively conscious of my body and not that I have it for a noticed, thematic object, and hence it would seem that the similarities motivate the transfer without even any question that the unique way in which my body is given might block the transfer since even to pose such a question would involve the kind of thematizing that is not found in the transfer (*Hua. XII*, p. 267).

Genetic phenomenology reveals empirical apperceptions which disclose a subject surpassing boundaries by automatically projecting or transposing itself beyond such boundaries, without necessarily even recognizing them. Husserl clearly distinguishes this method from a theoretical approach to empathy that, as he himself describes it, remarkably resembles the static phenomenological approach of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, whose effectiveness Schutz doubted:

It is to be observed that empirical apperceptions are not theoretical experiences, which rather already presuppose the corresponding apperceptions. I need not already have knowledge of myself as a person, I need not have reflected on myself on the basis of self-experience, and I need not have achieved a theoretical experiential representation of myself through theoretical acts actively directed to myself. I need not have observed by comparing, how I behave myself in different situations (*Hua. XII*, p. 431).

This dynamic of projecting oneself into new possibilities (e.g., transferring the sense-lived body onto another) is, of course, fundamental to Husserl's idea of basic perception insofar as the frontside of an object appresents a backside which we *could* make present. In addition, it is of the essence of our null-point of orientation that we can undertake changes of our surroundings and through the kinaesthetic processes of our body be able to occupy various spatial positions. Further, we anticipate how things would appear from another position if I would exchange my present bodily position with it; and in transposing my body to difference places, I also think my bodily-psychic self there and anticipate how things would appear to me if I were there (*Hua. XII*, pp. 276-277). Husserl repeatedly brings this realizing of perceptual possibilities into relationship with the process of empathy,

which realizes another possibility, namely that of analogically apperceiving a lived body on the basis of the similarity of the other's physical body to my own. Although Husserl often describes first the realizing of perceptual possibilities before empathetic apperception of the other, these realizations of perceptual possibilities do not account for the transfer of the sense "lived body" to the other, which instead happens on the basis of similarity of the other's body to my own (pp. 263-514). But once that transfer occurs, Husserl often welds the possibilities together and the other is often described as having a point of view on things that I would have if I were "there," where "there" refers both to another spatial position *and* to the body of the other occupying that spatial position (pp. 263-514). It is as though the conscious subject that is continually projecting itself into new possibilities, transferring its own sense of lived body to another despite the lack of originary access, subtly slips into thinking of what it has just achieved via analogical apperception as itself analogical to occupying a different spatial position, and, vice versa, the occupying of a different spatial position is taken as an analogue of appresenting another consciousness. And all this takes place however much one might to stop and protest, "¡But there are differences here!" Insofar as Husserl seems willing to detect an analogate of empathy in the realization of *spatial*-perceptual possibilities, it is perfectly consistent that he should also find analogates of empathy in *temporal* possibilities, such as in memory or projection into the future insofar as a I have a representation of myself as "another" subject to whom I do not have present access and to whom a different present is accessible than the present accessible to me now, insofar as my past or future self differs from my present self. Furthermore, there is a kind of "confirmation" insofar as this "other" acts concordantly with my present self (*Hua.* XIII, p. 52). Of course, memory or future projection differ fundamentally from empathy in that the latter involves an "other" self than myself, but that fact does not prevent Husserl from envisioning empathy as analogous to acts of temporal transcendence of the present (e.g. memory or future projection), just as he thought empathy to be analogous to acts of spatial transcendence in perception.

In conclusion, the subject that genetic phenomenology reveals and makes central is an analogizing, possibility-projecting, and possibility-realizing

subject who follows a fundamental law of consciousness in bringing similar presumptions to bear upon similar circumstances, almost without regard for the constraints that might render its analogizing questionable (though, as we have seen, such projections are not arbitrary either). It is a far different subject than the critical, theorizing subject of static phenomenology engaged in theoretically constituting the transcendental other, since this subject, at least as Schutz construes it, would find its analogizing stopped short because when the fundamental difference between my experience of my body and of the other's body appears.

Carr's Objections: Genetic Phenomenology and Possibility

David Carr's misgivings about a phenomenological approach to social relationships, of which he takes Schutz to be a representative, lead him to blame the concept of intentionality that leads to Schutz's approach being "too observational" (Carr, 1994, p. 331) insofar as he describes us as taking one another to be a person rather than some other thing and subsuming the other particular under a concept, thereby emphasizing the other's sameness rather than otherness. Insofar as Carr targets the phenomenological approach in general with its reliance on intentionality to be problematic, one could assume that Carr would consider Husserl's analysis of empathy to be equally problematic, especially insofar as Husserl regularly begins with the analogical apperception operative in our dealings with things and then extends it to our relations with others. Carr rejects such phenomenological approaches and turns instead to Hegel's insight that one only forms genuine community by overcoming an antagonism with some else through the pursuit of a common project, that is, by surpassing the face-to-face relationship in a joint undertaking whose proper subject is the *we*. Such a relationship is not a matter of a subject being related to an object as that which might obtain "between a scientific observer and his scientific object" (p. 332) but rather a question of participation or membership in the same community.

While one might attempt to defend Schutz by arguing that the intersubjectivity he describes is to be located in the pragmatic everyday life world and

not that of the theoretical sciences (pp. 240-241). Carr's criticisms do not seem to stand up against Husserl's genetic-phenomenological strategy, which we have explained in the previous sections. For Husserl, recognizing another lived body is a species of the kind of analogical apperception by which I immediately, via passive association, link one similar to another, applying a typification elicited by the multidimensional similarity obtaining between one analogate and the other, in this case between the other's body and my own, without, as Husserl suggests, inference or the deliberate collaboration of the ego (*ohne Ichaktivität*). The analogically apperceiving subject, prone to shoot beyond its legitimate limits, bypasses the kinds of obstacles of which it may be aware to a degree, but which the transcendental constitution of the other within the framework of a static phenomenology makes focal, to its own detriment in Schutz's view. Although Husserl often begins discussing our grasp of things, it is the pattern of analogical apperception that is generalized from our knowing of things to knowing of others, but clearly, as our presentation above shows, he also clearly recognizing that a different kind of knowing is involved in knowing others since there is no original givenness and since the knowing others stretches the meaning of analogical apperception itself—and we will discuss below just how unique empathetic knowing is. Furthermore, the analogical apperception of the others that the genetic approach to *Einfühlung* makes evident, although it is cognitive and intentional (hence motivational rather than causal) in character, relies upon passive syntheses and associations *ohne Ichaktivität*. As such, this phenomenological approach to the other hardly seems too observational, too conceptually oriented, or too scientifically distant in the attitude it takes up toward others, and thus it seems to escape many of the charges that Carr brings against it.

Carr's claim that one must overcome the face-to-face relationship with an antagonist in pursuit of a joint project suggests that forms of genuine community engaged in a we-project presuppose at some level a face-to-face relationship that must be overcome and this, in turn, indicates that the recognition of the other as a living body must have already taken place. "Every having of an effect by another presupposes empathy and completes itself continually in empathy or in mediate processes of understanding resting

upon it." Husserl asserts (*Hua.* XIV, p.184). Empathy constitutes a ground-layer (*Grundsichte*) of all real active co-living, co-acting, and communicating, and through empathy we have a common environing world (*Umwelt*), as Husserl shows in *Cartesian Mediations V* (*Hua.* I , p. 153). Speech itself grows within the context in which I have already appresentatively recognized the other's inner life on the basis of his or her bodily similarity with my own; I wouldn't speak to someone or something unless I had already perceived that person as a living body and capable of responding to language (*Hua.* XIV, pp. 331-332). As occurring at this ground-level, empathy involves a kind of distance from the other in the sense that we each have our own goals and own life and I do not live the other's life as feeling and acting, and this ground level empathy contrasts with higher-level sympathy that consists in a "taking over" of the other's perspective (*Hua.* XV, pp. 512-513). As a consequence, the kind of participation in the other, which Carr recommends and which Husserl himself describes at one point as being sunken in another in co-feeling (*Mitfühlen*) and as being directed not upon the other person as an object but upon what we both are directed to, takes place according to Husserl in relationship with (*the already*) empathetically presentified ego (*mit dem einföhlungsmässig vergegenwärtigten Ich*) of the other (*Hua.* XV, pp. 51-514).

Not only is empathy to be distinguished as a grounding substratum for higher acts (e.g. sympathy) involved in relating to another, but Carr's criticism that the phenomenological approach assimilates relating to the other to knowing an object fails to understand that empathy consists of experiences of a new type, with a new type of object belonging to a distinctive object-region-a type of experience that Husserl takes great pains to distinguish from other types of experience (*Hua.* XIV, p. 358). Empathy is one of the family of acts that fall under the concept "presentification" (*Vergegenwärtigung*), which involves a modification of the perceptual act but which is distinct from perception in that it lacks original intuition (p. 4). The distinction between perception and presentification helps Husserl distinguish things from others insofar as the appresented side of a thing can usually be led over into intuitive perception, whereas, as we have seen, the appresented inner life of another can never be brought to such perceptual givenness but can only be presentified (p. 363). Clearly then Husserl draws a clear distinction between recognizing

another through presentifying and being presented directly with an object, but, because empathy takes place immediately, semi-automatically, and without theorizing or inference, he also at times speaks of it as a “seeing” or even finds the term “empathetic perception” (*emfühhlende Wahrnehmung*) superior to “empathy” (*Empföhlung*) alone. In a sense, Husserl draws on a whole set of analogies here, how empathy is like and unlike perception, how appresentation functions differently with things and lived beings, and how presentification differs from perception—all in order to circle around and define the distinctive experience of empathy.

This comparing and contrasting analogizing continues in his further discussion of empathy as a form of “presentification.” Husserl compares empathy to two other forms of presentification, namely memory and anticipation, insofar as these latter two acts reach to another “I” which is not present in my present (*Hua.* XV, pp. 449-551). However, the fundamental difference between memory and anticipation, on the one hand, and empathy, on the other, is that in the latter it is *another’s* ego and not my own, which I access through empathetic presentification and in the case of memory and anticipation I am able to remain within the stream of my own consciousness instead of reaching into another’s (*Hua.* XIV, p. 560). Given the similarities and differences that appear in this discussion of “presentification”, it is no wonder that Husserl concludes “The empathetic presentifications are in their essence-peculiarities different from all other presentifications” (*Hua.* XV, p. 354).

Finally, empathy is analogous to phantasy in its “as if” functioning without originary, perceptual access to the other’s consciousness, but it differs in that it has to do with the *being* of the other (*Hua.* XIV, p. 499). Whereas in the case of phantasy, as we have seen, an image awakens what is imagined, in empathy the other’s body (*Körper*) awakens my sense of my own body (*Leibkörper*) leading to appresentation of the other’s inner life (p. 487). The other’s body and my inner life that it reminds me of, then, do not function, as we have seen, as “images” for his or her inner life, but as an apperceptive basis, and similarly we are not involved in “extrajecting” (*extrajizieren*) an arbitrary, phantasied sensation or feeling onto the other (p.164). In a sense, empathy is still too wedded to the perceptual, empirical world to be too

narrowly associated with phantasy that is set free to a much greater degree from it. Husserl's unhappiness with equating empathy with phantasy -which requires that previous talk in this paper about the subject of potentialities "projecting" itself into the other not be taken in any arbitrary, fantastic sense- appears clearly when he observes:

The "as if" of presentification takes on therefore the character of a continually positing presentification, and one that is appresentative in character. It is continually so, as if I, with a modified body (*Leib*) and modified ego-being and ego-consciousness were over there and, as if I would already be behaving bodily and inwardly in a definite manner. Consequently this "as if" is not arbitrary, not merely a matter of phantasy, but continually demanded in a definite way by the experienced outerness of the body (*Körpers*) over there. It is a matter of positing it in certainty, with continually new horizons, which are fulfilled, which always in the milieu of the as if lead to a fulfilling as if (*Hua*. XIV, p. 500).

Part of the problem of Held's earlier described critique is that it assimilates the phantasy dimension involved in empathy with "pure phantasy," and as Aguirre shows, there are different kinds of phantasy possible, just as there are different kinds of presentification and all these distinctions are needed in order to grasp accurately the unique kind of act that empathy is.

Carr's complaint that phenomenology of the social seems to reduce to a knowing of objects fails to see how, Husserl theorizes by drawing analogies between empathy and other acts (perception, memory, phantasy), hence by deploying an methodology that itself is a theoretical analogizing method, which may have its roots in the analogizing apperception through which we approach the world and others pretheoretically. By showing the likeness and difference between empathy and other acts, Husserl reveals the novelty and creativity of a distinctive way of knowing: "empathy"-whose distinctive features we have not previously recognized, even though we rely pervasively upon it. In revealing this new way of knowing that draws on, resembles, and differs in subtle ways from so many other modes of intentionally relating to the world- we also see revealed the creativity and capacity to realize new possibilities of that subject who has not rested content when ordinary experience of the other has been denied it.

Finally, one last point: Husserl considers *Einfühlung* along with understanding others (*Verstehen*) as foundational, the basis on which other acts rest, in particular acts of communication (*Hua*. XIII, p. 98). It also lies at the basis of all the social relationships that make up our lives together and the social sciences and science in general. It is, for instance, the presupposition of writing papers, like this one, for each other or of speaking at conferences. Empathy, then, represents a possibility that makes other possibilities possible. Consequently, Husserl concludes a section discussing these higher forms of social unity by stating of empathy “It must define together everything” (*Hua*. XIV, pp. 98-104).

Conclusion

This paper has considered two major objections to Husserl’s approach to empathy: Schutz’s view that lack of access to the other’s originary experience blocks the analogical apperceptive transfer of the sense “lived body” to the other and Carr’s view that the intentional approach to the other resembles too much the model of a scientist confronting objects. The paper has shown why the elements that Schutz takes to be irreconcilable (the similarity of the other’s body to mine and the radically different way our two bodies are given to me) are not even noticed as a problem in Husserl’s *Nachlass* writings. These elements are not irreconcilable insofar as Husserl deploys a genetic approach to reconstructing the mundane subject as opposed to project of transcendentally constituting the other within the static phenomenology that Husserl claims to be the methodology of the Fifth Meditation. Furthermore, that genetic methodology discloses a subject ever able to project immediately and realize new possibilities, often overshooting its limits, if it even recognizes them. That Husserl himself seemed to be oblivious to the central inconsistency that Schutz finds in the *Cartesian Meditations* may offer evidence for the fact that Husserl’s approach in those Mediations is much more under the sway of a genetic phenomenology than he recognized himself. The genetic phenomenology and the potency-realizing subject it manifests also undercut Carr’s charge that phenomenology’s emphasis on intentionality has resulted in an overly intellectualized approach to intersubjectivity, and

the genetic phenomenology illuminates how empathy itself constitutes an entirely new form of knowing when compared with its various analogates, a form of knowing that is not reducible to the perception of things and that is the presupposition of the higher level acts (e.g. sympathy) that are basic for social life.

Of course, this paper has not solved the question of whether the transcendental constitution of another through a static phenomenology is possible or not—and philosophers such as Römpp argue that it is indispensable for genetic phenomenology⁷—or whether Schutz's criticisms are telling on that level. Such a discussion would require a more sophisticated discussion of the double reduction, the *Erste Philosophie*, and the relationship between static and genetic phenomenology.

References

- Aguirre, A. (s.f). *Genetische Phänomenologie und Reduktion: Zur Letztbegründung der Wissenschaft aus der radikalen Skepsis im Denken E. Husserls*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhof.
- Carr, D. (1994). *Alfred Shutz and the project of phenomenological Social theory in phenomenology of cultural disciplines*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Edmund, H. (1973). *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster teil Vxiii*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Held, K. (1972). *Das Problem der Intersubjektivität und die Idee einer phänomenologischen Transzendentalphilosophie. In Perspektiv*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhof.

⁷ For instance, Römpp contends that the genetic phenomenology presupposes the objective experience of the other's body as a basis for the transfer, but such objectivity itself is in need of a transcendental account of which the presence of others is a key component. Furthermore, genetic phenomenology takes its start from what static phenomenology has clarified as a *Leitfaden*.

- Husserl, E. (1950). *Cartesianische Meditation und Pariser Vorträge*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl, E. (1973). *Husserliana*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl, E. (1952). *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, ed. Marly Biemel, Hua IV. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Iribarne, H. T. (1973). "Einleitung des Herausgebers". *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Texte aus dem Nachlass, Dritter Teil: 1905-1920*, ed. Iso Kern, *Husserliana*, vol. XV. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Römpp, G. (1992). *Husserls Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Und ihre Bedeutung für eine Theorie intersubjektiver Objektivität und die Konzeption einer Phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Schutz, A. (1966). *The problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Yamaguchi, I. (1982). *Passive Synthesis und Intersubjektivität bei Edmund Husserl*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.